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Abstract
The U.S. intervention in El Salvador had a number of unintended consequences,
some negative and some positive, that still have a great impact on the U.S., El Salvador,
and the international community as a whole today. Although the focus of the mass media
is on the negative unintended consequences, the positive really outweigh the negative.
These so-called unintended consequences began with a massive increase in immigration
to escape the violent human rights violations and political persecutions of El Salvador’s
Civil War. This migration to the U.S. in the 1980s is referred to as the Salvadoran
Diaspora, which led to an increasing number of activist community organizations
founded to help these Salvadoran refugees, even though U.S. policy would not recognize
migrants arriving from El Salvador as such. These organizations were largely led by
Salvadoran and Latin American immigrants who had arrived in the U.S. during the
Salvadoran Diaspora and were all, for the most part, located within the communities in
which the migrants were arriving, in this case Los Angeles, and settling in. This cycle of
unintended consequences and reactions would change alongside the needs of the
Salvadoran communities following the end of El Salvador’s Civil War with the
implementation of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords in order to increase focus on
helping the Salvadoran community gain legal residency status. Additionally, new activist
community organizations were created to focus on continued legal representation and
advocacy, access to education, and the maintenance and growth of a transnational
Salvadoran identity through the promotion of a shared memory of the Salvadoran Civil
War and the Salvadoran Diaspora. Therefore, in order to adequately explore the
relationship between the U.S. and El Salvador, an emphasis must be placed on both the
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positive and negative unintended consequences of intervention, including, but not limited
to, the Salvadoran Diaspora, the creation of a distinctly Salvadoran transnational
community in Los Angeles, and the establishment of activist community organizations.

v

1
Introduction
The history of the United States contains a series of complicated international
relationships and controversial foreign policy positions, as well as a number of political
scandals and debates that have captivated the attention of the American public. However,
due partially to the explosion of social media platforms and twenty-four-hour news
cycles, none have been as pervasive as the presidential campaign, and subsequent
election, of Donald Trump. So far, Trumps presidency can be characterized, as comedian
John Mulaney put it, as if “there is a horse loose in a hospital…it’s never happened
before, no one knows what the horse is going to do next, least of all the horse – he’s
never been in a hospital before!”1 One aspect of Trump’s foreign policy, and immigration
policy, that has garnered particular attention and outrage, for good reason, has been his
stance on topics surrounding immigration and Central America. The debates that emerged
in American society following the November 2016 election of Trump were not new in
any way, but the significant level of attention given to Central America, and El Salvador
in particular, in the eyes of the American public and international community drastically
resurged.
Largely due to the widespread misinformation regarding the historical
background of this migration pattern, the lasting effects of the role of United States
foreign policy and intervention in Central America, and the constant barrage of negative
depictions of Central Americans by the mass media, this increased focus has been
polluted by inaccurate and negative alternative histories to fit the official narrative of

John Mulaney, “John Mulaney: Kid Gorgeous at Radio City,” directed by Alex Timbers, May 1, 2018,
Netflix video, 44:34-50-58.
1
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Trump and his supporters. Additionally, the rise and intersecting of xenophobia,
nativism, and patriotism within the United States over the past few years has led to a
polarized anti-immigrant American public that has disproportionately impacted Central
Americans within the United States. Although this conglomeration of xenophobic,
nativist, and anti-immigrant rhetoric characterized by Trump’s classic rallying cry of
“Build a Wall” is not historically new, nor is it unique to the United States, its present
version is dangerous and has the potential to have even more detrimental international
consequences than what has already happened. There are a variety of reasons as to why
these particular debates on topics surrounding the historically-intertwined relationship
between the United States and Central America, specifically El Salvador, and the pattern
of immigration from Central America to the United States had not previously pervaded
the collective American public’s consciousness despite the existence of similar political
debates for years prior to Trump’s election. Firstly, the uniquely Trumpian brand of
polarizing and incendiary rhetoric based on incomplete, or entirely inaccurate, claims are
unique at the very least in the modern age of social media. In other words, “when a horse
is loose in a hospital, you’ve got to stay updated,”2 and, due to the number of biased news
media reports on complicated and deeply historically-based sociopolitical debates
constantly available to the public through their fingertips, a majority of the American
public is misinformed or unaware of the inaccuracies propelling Trumpian rhetoric
forward.
Therefore, providing a more complete historical background that does not dwell
solely on the negative and actually mentions the positive is necessary to combat the
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further growth of the anti-immigrant and anti-Central American sentiment that is rooted
in the underlying partial and negative narrative. For this reason, this thesis seeks to
historically contextualize one of the largest contemporary debates plaguing both the
United States and the international community as a whole through a more complete
analysis of the entangled relationship of the United States and El Salvador since the Cold
War. It will also discuss both the positive and negative unintended consequences of the
U.S. intervention in the Cold War-era Salvadoran Civil War, the subsequent Salvadoran
Diaspora to urban centers of the United States, specifically Los Angeles, and the longlasting consequences of this relationship from the onset to the present.
Although the Cold War, and the U.S. interventions in countless nations perceived
as going “red,” has been extensively covered by historians, the historiography focused
specifically on the U.S. role in the Salvadoran Civil War has been comparatively limited
up until recent years. Additionally, even though El Salvador did gain a place in the
national consciousness of the American public, as well as the international community as
a whole, in the later period of the Salvadoran Civil War and immediately following the
end of the Salvadoran Civil War with the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords due to the
increase in attention to the pattern of human rights violations occurring inside El
Salvador from 1980 to 1992, this attention quickly shifted back away from El Salvador
after the Salvadoran “fifteen minutes of fame” had ended. This comparatively small
historiography related to, and public knowledge on, the Salvadoran Civil War and the
subsequent increased relationship between the United States and El Salvador can partially
be accounted for because of the relatively recent, and still incomplete, declassification of

4
Department of State and other official U.S. government documents detailing the role
played by the U.S. and the ongoing human rights violations in El Salvador.
Additionally, many of the contemporary histories of U.S. immigration studies,
foreign policy studies, and U.S. Cold War-era interventions focus exclusively on the
negative unintended consequences regarding U.S. action, or inaction, regarding said
topics. In recent years, starting largely in the late 1990s and accelerating in the 2000s,
many disciplines outside of history, including political science, sociology, anthropology,
psychology, and many others, have attempted to address this gap by moving away from
analyses focused on traditional Cold War political histories to more social and
transnational accounts. Recently and fairly limitedly, historians have reflected this
academic shift regarding El Salvador, even just in comparison to the significantly larger
focus on Nicaragua’s similar historic experiences. Therefore, by focusing more on a
combination of the “positive” unintended consequences, the political, social, and
economic impacts of U.S. intervention, and a more social historical approach to a
traditionally political history topic, this history functions as an attempt to bridge the gap.
It is important to note that by referring to the unintended consequences largely focused on
throughout the next three chapters as “positive,” I am by no means attempting to
trivialize the very real violence, political persecution, and trauma faced and endured by
the Salvadoran people throughout and following El Salvador’s Civil War. In referring to
unintended consequences like the foundation of activist community organizations, a
transnational Salvadoran identity, and a thriving Salvadoran community within Los
Angeles as “positive,” I only intend to emphasize the under-mentioned ability of the
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Salvadoran community to make the best out of a terrible situation and ongoing
sociopolitical exclusion.
Although the topics covered throughout the following three chapters are fairly
expansive and are able to provide a comprehensive history of the unintended
consequences of U.S. intervention in El Salvador, as well as the necessary information
required to contextualize many of the contemporary foreign policy and immigration
debates, the focus of this thesis does leave room for future scholarly exploration into
related topics. Topics for future research include, but are not limited to, how the activist
community organizations were funded, the demographic makeup of the activist
community organizations, other similar organizations outside of the six focused on, the
physical process of immigration during the Salvadoran Diaspora, and a more in-depth
analysis than done here of El Salvador’s sociopolitical and economic structures, the
groups that made up the umbrella organization of the FMLN, and further instances of
both negative and positive unintended consequences from 1980 to the present. As
previously stated, part of this limitation was due to the limited accessibility of documents
from Salvadoran sources, information from and on the roles played by other activist
community organizations, and the delayed declassification process concerning U.S.
government documents from around the mid-1990s and on. That being said, one
historiographical contribution of this thesis is the extensive use of primary source
documents from the United States government on the intervention in and the relationship
with El Salvador that were found, researched, and incorporated into this thesis from
personal archival research done in the National Archives at College Park, the National
Archives in D.C., and the Library of Congress. Additionally, much of the information
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included on the activist community organizations came out of interviews conducted
personally with members of said organizations. The inclusion of findings from both the
archival research and the interviews alone add to the existing historiography and the
arguments made through an analysis of said sources, especially in conjunction with more
widely used or referenced primary and secondary source material, allowed for this thesis
to make a new contribution to the existing historiography.
The U.S. intervention in El Salvador began in the 1930s with economic
motivations, as did many of the U.S. Latin American interventions, which would lead to
an increased economic inequality that would cause an undue strain on the wellbeing of
the working peasant class. The peasantry rebelled, and the Salvadoran government and
military forces brutally responded in a violent and indiscriminate repression known as La
Matanza. This set a violent and memorable standard for the general Salvadoran public
and contributed to the Salvadoran government’s all-encompassing power to deter future
uprisings despite the continued and growing inequality and dissatisfaction of the
Salvadoran public. Therefore, due to this standard set by the government’s violent
reaction, there was a fear within El Salvador of rebelling that persisted over the next few
decades up until the years prior to the start of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980.
Additionally, U.S. influence in El Salvador shifted from solely economic to social and
political following the start of the Cold War and the success of the Cuban Revolution.
However, in the 1980s, the umbrella organization Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front, or the FMLN, would unite a wide range of guerrilla and revolutionary
forces within and would initiate El Salvador’s Civil War. This Civil War was
characterized by indiscriminate government repression and state-sponsored military
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violence and persecution similar to that of La Matanza. However, the main difference
between La Matanza and the Salvadoran Civil War was that the Salvadoran government
and military had a much greater reach and ability to combat the revolutionary FMLN
because of backing and financial support from the U.S. government. This U.S.
intervention greatly contributed to the extended conflict and violence of El Salvador’s
Civil War, which lasted twelve years, and in furthering the Salvadoran government’s
goals of eliminating the revolutionary FMLN and reinforcing the legitimacy of the
existing government and institutional structures that were beneficial to U.S. economic,
social, and political interests in El Salvador.
The U.S. intervention in El Salvador had a number of unintended consequences,
some negative and some positive, that still have a great impact on the U.S., El Salvador,
and the international community as a whole today. Although the focus is on these
negative unintended consequences, the positive really outweigh the negative. These socalled unintended consequences began with a massive increase in immigration to escape
the violent human rights violations and political persecutions of El Salvador’s Civil War
from El Salvador to the United States in the 1980s under what is referred to as the
Salvadoran Diaspora. This increased migration led to an increasing number of activist
community organizations focused on helping these Salvadoran refugees, even though
U.S. policy would not recognize migrants arriving from El Salvador as such. These
organizations were largely led by Salvadoran and Latin American immigrants who had
arrived in the U.S. during the Salvadoran Diaspora due to the violence created by the
U.S.-backed regime and were all, for the most part, located within the communities in
which the migrants were arriving, in this case Los Angeles, and settling in.
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This cycle of unintended consequences and reactions would change alongside the
changing needs of the Salvadoran communities following the end of El Salvador’s Civil
War with the implementation of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords in order to increase
focus on helping the Salvadoran community that had arrived during the Salvadoran
Diaspora gain legal residency status. As the needs of the community evolved, more
activist community organizations were created with programs that focused on continued
legal representation and advocacy, access to education, and the maintenance and growth
of a transnational Salvadoran identity through the promotion of a shared memory of the
Salvadoran Civil War and the Salvadoran Diaspora. However, the negative unintended
consequences of gang creation in the U.S. and the increasingly strict U.S. criminal,
deportation, and immigration and refugee policies that evolved alongside these positive
unintended consequences would have a negative impact on both the Salvadoran state and
the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran community. This evolving nature of the U.S.Salvadoran relationship ultimately contributed to a “new” Salvadoran Diaspora that
sparked a resurgence of attention on El Salvador and, more broadly, Central America as a
whole and renewed focus on contemporary debates concerning U.S. immigration and
foreign policy. Therefore, in order to adequately and accurately explore the relationship
between the United States and El Salvador, an emphasis must be placed on both the
positive and negative unintended consequences of the Cold War-era intervention,
including, but not limited to, the Salvadoran Diaspora, the creation of a distinctly
Salvadoran transnational community and identity in Los Angeles, the establishment of
activist community organizations, and the greater impacts of the Salvadoran-American
community’s conceptualization as El Salvador’s “Departamento 15.”
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In order to best articulate these deeply complex and interconnected arguments,
these next three chapters progress in a relatively chronological structure. Chapter One
provides a majority of the historical background to the beginning of El Salvador’s Civil
War and the theoretical definitions necessary to understanding the following arguments.
Chapter Two deals largely with the period containing a bulk of the actual conflict of the
Salvadoran Civil War, the start of the Salvadoran Diaspora in the 1980s, and the initial
stages of community building within Los Angeles. Additionally, Chapter Two introduces
the first three activist community organizations that played a significant role in the
Salvadoran community within Los Angeles during the Civil War. Chapter Three builds
on the roles of the initial activist community organizations from Chapter Two, as well as
the foundation of other activist community organizations within Los Angeles during the
negotiations of and following the ratification of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. It
is in this context that Chapter Three makes arguments on the evolving needs of the
individuals within the Salvadoran community in Los Angeles and the simultaneous
changing of the activist community organizations to accommodate and best serve the
needs of the community. Finally, the Conclusion continues the contemporary connections
begun in the Introduction and further extends the argument as to why, in the current
sociopolitical climate, a more complete and source-based historical analysis of the U.S.
relationship with El Salvador is vital for both policymakers and the American and
international public’s understanding of the underlying roots of immigration and foreign
policy debates and practices.
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Chapter One: Political Violence and the U.S. Role in El Salvador Prior to the Civil
War
In January 1981, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
launched their first “Final Offensive” against the Salvadoran government. This marked
the official beginning of the brutal twelve-year Civil War in El Salvador. However, the
roots of this conflict and the contributing causal factors are rooted much deeper in the
history of El Salvador. Since the 1930s, economic inequality, military control of the
government, and a pattern of human rights violations and state-sanctioned repressive
violence has defined the Salvadoran socio-political landscape. However, throughout this
fifty-year period, domestic efforts at reform, the gradual revolutionizing of key figures in
the Salvadoran Civil War, and international intervention and influence in El Salvador
grew and laid the foundation for the creation of the FMLN and the beginning of El
Salvador’s insurgent Civil War. Therefore, the root causes of El Salvador’s Civil War can
be broadly broken up into three periods, defined by the 1932 Matanza, the start of the
Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, and the buildup to the unification of multiple
insurgent groups under the FMLN umbrella organization through the 1970s up until
October 1980. Salvadoran history asks us to question typical Cold War chronologies
because it shows how communism played a role in Salvadoran-U.S. relations in the
aftermath of the Russian Revolution (1917) and global depression of 1929.
Much of the preexisting historiography on El Salvador’s Civil War places it as a
case study of the larger global Cold War. Both internal and external factors have shaped
El Salvador’s conflict. Internally, El Salvador’s dramatically uneven economy was
upheld by a small ruling class, leaving a majority of the population out of the economic
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and political system. One of the most influential domestic structural problems plaguing
El Salvador was that of the unified power held by the economic elites and the military
over key economic, social, and political institutions. This power-based partnership began
around the 1880s during the “golden age of coffee” and would persist, in one form or
another, until 1979. Externally, the United States supported the Salvadoran oligarchy on
the basis that they were anti-communist and protected U.S. economic interests. The Cold
War politics of the region changed dramatically with the successful Cuban Revolution
that took place 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Twenty years later, the successful
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua also dramatically shaped El Salvador’s geopolitical
landscape.3
Historical Background
The period from 1880 to the Great Depression was considered the “golden age of
the coffee elite” in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. According to historian
Jeffery Paige, “coffee and power have been closely linked in Central America since the
nineteenth century.”4 As small El Salvador became an increasingly large player in the
global coffee trade, it became more and more reliant on the export of the single product
of coffee than other nations like Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In order to increase
production of this export commodity, the coffee elites engaged in land speculation to
concentrate their ownership over the previously communal agricultural land. Increased
economic pressure led small peasant farmers, many of whom were Indians, to sell their
land to the prosperous coffee estates. This led to an increase in available rural agricultural
3

Jeffery M. Paige, Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 3-34.
4
Paige, Coffee and Power, 3.

12
workers who ultimately received smaller and smaller wages due to the overabundance of
labor.5
The coffee elite survived the challenge to their power and continued to control El
Salvador’s economy, despite a downturn in their power during the depression.
Oppositional movements in the late 1920s and early 1930s did reduce the coffee elites’
direct political power and made it apparent that the coffee oligarchy would no longer be
able to maintain complete social, economic, and political control on its own. This led to
an alliance of convenience, rather than of ideological compatibility, between the
economically powerful coffee elite and the newly politically powerful military
dictatorships. Despite the negative experience in El Salvador prompted by the global
Great Depression, the coffee elite “did not question the logic of the system of export
agriculture on which the coffee republic had rested.”6 The sharing of power between the
coffee elite and the military dictatorships allowed the former to avoid any economic
reforms that might have helped Salvadoran society as a whole, but would have come at
the expense of the coffee oligarchy. Ultimately, in the period following 1932 through
1979, the year of Nicaragua’s socialist revolution, the alliance between the coffee
oligarchy and the military dictatorships continued, and the Salvadoran “coffee elites
traded the right to rule with the right to make money.”7 Therefore, the lack of structural
reform that would correct social, political, and, in particular, economic inequities during

5

Erik Ching, Stories of Civil War in El Salvador: A Battle Over Memory (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2016), 26; Paige, Coffee and Power, 22; Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in
El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011), 17-21.
6
Enrique A. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1982), 14.
7
Paige, Coffee and Power, 22.
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the 1930s contributed greatly to creating the inequality in Salvadoran society that would
persist and expand in the period leading up to the Salvadoran Civil War.
This new power structure in El Salvador became increasingly evident with the
start of the sixteen-year authoritarian, repressive, and extremely violent rule of General
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1931. It was the military-backed dictatorship of
Hernández Martínez that set in place the ongoing pattern of coups and military juntas that
would define the next fifty years of Salvadoran politics. Hernández Martínez came to
power less than nine months following what is widely accepted as El Salvador’s first free
and fair democratic presidential election in 1931 that resulted with the victory of Arturo
Araujo. Araujo ran on a platform similar to that of the British Labour Party and was a
reform-minded landowner who “promised economic and social reforms.”8 Although the
presidential race was close, the election was ultimately called in favor of Arturo Araujo
who became president and installed Hernández Martínez as vice president. As president,
Araujo attempted to make good on the promises of reform he made during the campaign.
Araujo decided that, in order to attempt to soften the impact of the Great Depression on
the Salvadoran working class, he would pass tax reforms and reduce the military’s
budget. The military did not like that their perceived power was being challenged by
Araujo’s proposed reforms and military budget cuts. Attempting a reform that the
military perceived to be a challenge to their power, proved to be the crucial mistake that
ultimately put the final nail in the coffin of Araujo’s presidency. In December of 1931,
after only being president for nine months, a military officer-led coup overthrew Araujo’s

8
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democratically elected government and began the military dictatorship led by General
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.9
La Matanza
Although the Matanza in January of 1932 would ultimately become famous for
the sheer level of violence and state-sponsored murder and repression, before the
Matanza, peasant uprisings were recurrent features in El Salvador throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries because “peasants had a long history of resorting to
violence when they believed all other avenues to achieving their goals had been closed to
them.”10 However, in suppressing and responding previous similar uprisings, the
Salvadoran government did not come anywhere close to the level of mass slaughter as
that in January 1932. There are many different competing and complementary
interpretation as to why the 1932 Matanza turned into such an extremely large-scale
massacre, but many of the dominant explanations include an anti-communism sentiment
as playing a major role in El Salvador’s Matanza. Additionally, immediately following
the Matanza, the state’s political violence against the peasant rebellion was justified as a
means of preventing the spread of communism in El Salvador and the United States did
not condemn the violence of the Salvadoran state because of its anti-communist stance.
Therefore, the 1932 Matanza, although long before the U.S. anti-communist Cold War
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Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton
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New Mexico Press, 2007), 1-2, 24-27.
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stance, helped set the precedent for U.S. foreign policy and hemispheric relations with
Latin America throughout the Cold War.
In late January 1932, the combination of an increasingly exploitative economic
system based on the production and export of coffee, ongoing social tensions, and
dissatisfaction with the newly established military dictatorship of Hernández Martínez, a
group of farmers, agricultural workers, and Indians staged a rebellion in western El
Salvador. Another contributing factor to sparking this 1932 uprising was the notoriously
high population density within El Salvador. Although the rebellion was distinctly
centered in the western countryside, this region directly resembled the rest of the country.
For example, El Salvador was a predominately agricultural nation with an
“overwhelmingly rural, poor population,” and so “regardless of where people lived
throughout the country, they tended to reside in rural districts on the outskirts of small
regional towns.”11 This high population density within El Salvador as a whole was
especially problematic in western El Salvador, where a large amount of the nation’s
Indian population resided. The combination of poor peasant farmers and Indians who
were reliant on the coffee industry and the damage done to this industry in the wake of
the Great Depression led the already disgruntled western portion of El Salvador to take
action in the form of an uprising against the institutions of power that they saw as a major
root cause of the daily problems they were facing.
The pressures imposed on the peasants by commercial coffee production in the
western highlands of El Salvador led to the initial peasant revolt. The group of rebels
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largely directed their attacks at “symbols of local power, such as government buildings,
businesses, homes, military garrisons, and local Ladino elites.”12 The military’s
counteroffensive against this rebellion began almost immediately in order to stop the
rebellion from spreading to the rest of El Salvador and would continue for almost a
month. During this time, the government and military indiscriminately massacred anyone
even remotely close to where the uprisings took place. This mass slaughter of Salvadoran
peasants would, from then on, be known as the Matanza, or massacre. The estimated
number of people murdered by the state ranges from 8,000 to 30,000, but there is no
official number because actually counting the number of dead bodies was far too risky for
anyone to undertake.13
Although the legacy of the Matanza was important in radicalizing a lot of the key
figures in El Salvador, events over the next fifty years, particularly following the Cuban
Revolution and during John F. Kennedy’s presidency, would use and build on this legacy
to garner more widespread support in El Salvador for another uprising. Immediately
following the Matanza, communism was recognized as one of the main driving forces
behind the peasant uprisings by individuals in both in El Salvador and in the United
States. Additionally, as time went on, the historical memory of the Matanza by
individuals on both the left and the right increasingly attributed the role of communist
and anti-communist sentiments to the uprising and the government’s reactionary
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slaughter of between 8,000 and 30,000 peasants. However, those on the left remembered
the Matanza as “act of heroism by the Communist Party,” while the right “reinterpreted
1932 as a victory over communist subversion.”14 Despite these conflicting views of the
Matanza, the fact that multiple different interpretations of the event acknowledge the role
played by anti-communist sentiment in contributing to the violent and repressive
response of the Salvadoran government and military to the Matanza provides a fair
amount of credibility to this argument. Additionally, the political polarization over the
memory of the Matanza would only grow over the next fifty years, which contributed
greatly to setting the stage for the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980.
The Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCS), or the Salvadoran Communist
Party, which was founded in 1930. Additionally, 1930 marked the return of Farabundo
Martí, a student organizer and member of the Central American Socialist Party, to El
Salvador. Martí also headed El Salvador’s chapter of Soccorro Rojo Internacional (SRI)
which, as it described itself in one of its leaflets, was a “vast organization, without party
affiliation, which accepts the idea of class struggle. It proposes to defend all the workers
who are persecuted by imperialism, capitalist governments, and all other agencies of
oppression…proportioning its legal aid and material and moral support to workers and
their families.”15 Although SRI distinctly stated that they were unaffiliated with any party
or communist organization, their support for the victims of capitalism was, in the
atmosphere created by the first Red Scare, enough for them to be demonized in the eyes
of the anti-communist Salvadoran government.
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The tensions surrounding the first Red Scare also played a role in how
international outsiders would interpret, and react to, the Matanza. Only a few days after
the initial peasant uprising, and long before the amount of reactionary state-sponsored
violence and mass slaughter was even close to finishing, the New York Times ran an
article entitled “Red Revolt Sweeps Cities in Salvador.” In this article, William J.
McCafferty, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in San Salvador, provided information on the
high level of violence in El Salvador caused by these uprisings, and, in reporting back to
the State Department, had advocated for the United States to dispatch naval vessels to El
Salvador in an attempt to “prevent much bloodshed.”16 The article reported that, after this
initial report of violence in El Salvador’s cities, that the United States Navy, along with
Great Britain and Canada, sent warships because of the information the State Department
received from McCafferty. The State Department, through the information released in
this article, then tried to frame this decision favorably by saying that this action was out
of concern for the U.S. citizens in El Salvador. The New York Times article then reported
that, just prior to telephone communications being cut off, McCafferty informed the State
Department that “serious disorders of a communistic nature had broken out,” and that
officials were convinced that the uprisings were a result of the “genuine drive of
Reds…who have been fairly numerous in El Salvador.”17 The use of the U.S. public’s
fear of communism following the “Red” revolt was successful in framing and justifying
intervening in El Salvador in 1932, and would somewhat foreshadow how the United
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States would use the Cold War ideological tensions to justify intervening in El Salvador’s
Civil War fifty years later.
Overall, the real level of influence communism and anti-communism played in
the 1932 peasant uprising and the subsequent Matanza is unknown, but, during the 1920s
and 1930s, the Salvadoran government did establish a pattern of using anti-communist
sentiment to justify the repression of dissident workers. However, “many Salvadorans
considered communism to be only one of many factors shaping their society,” and often
cited concern about “ethnic conflict over land” in the years leading up to and following
the Matanza.18 Despite the presence of economic and ethnic tensions, over time the
Matanza would increasingly be interpreted as an uprising sparked by the Salvadoran
Communist Party and brutally shut down by the anti-communist military dictatorship of
General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.19
The violent legacy of the Matanza would continue to grow and influence a rising
number of Salvadoran individuals and groups to begin thinking about the need for
structural reform that would ultimately result in the Salvadoran Civil War. However, it
would be far too simplistic to argue that this singular event was what led to the creation
of the FMLN and the start of the Salvadoran Civil War. Therefore, the Matanza alone did
not directly lead to the creation of the FMLN or the FMLN launching its first “Final
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Offensive” in January 1981. However, the legacy of the Salvadoran government’s violent
and repressive reaction to any potential reform-minded uprising, like that of January
1932, did set the standard of what would happen if another uprising was attempted
without the support of the Salvadoran general public and the proper preparation of the
rebel groups to adequately combat any counterinsurgency launched by the military
dictatorships. This standard of state-sponsored violence, and the relative ongoing strength
of the military dictatorships, prevented any real attempt at reform in El Salvador up until
1979.
Additionally, although the events of the 1932 Matanza did not directly lead to the
start of the 1980 Civil War, they did provide a substantial contribution. In the FMLN’s
report detailing their plans for El Salvador’ “democratic revolutionary victory,” the
events surrounding the 1932 Matanza were directly referenced. In this document that
accompanied the insurgent actions of the first “Final Offensive,” the FMLN begins their
arguments on the issues surrounding the political process in El Salvador by stating that
“with the uprising of 1932, in which more than 30,000 workers and peasants were
massacred, the military dictatorship in El Salvador consolidated itself. Since then, the
political power has been taken over by the Army, alternatively placing military men at
the head of the government through coups or fraudulent elections.”20 Although this
document clearly has an underlying political motivation, the argument that the FMLN
made surrounding the repression and issues with the political process in El Salvador and
continuing up until 1981, when this was written, is fairly justified. Therefore, although
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the historical roots of the Salvadoran Civil War cannot solely be traced back to the 1932
Matanza, it did play a large contributing factor and initiated many of the issues that
persisted and evolved over the next fifty years.
Following the Matanza, political life in El Salvador continued to be largely
characterized by strong military dictatorships monopolizing political power and the elite
coffee plantation owners monopolizing economic power, which left little to no space for
any real sociopolitical or socioeconomic reform. However, the social memory of the
Matanza would contribute to the radicalization of Salvadorans that lived through, or were
born shortly after, 1932. One of these key emerging revolutionary figures was Roque
Dalton, who was born in 1935. Roque Dalton was a prominent Salvadoran poet and
author that identified as a Marxist and would wind up becoming one of the political
leaders of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), which was an important group under
the umbrella coalition of the FMLN. Roque Dalton’s father, Winnall, was a member of
the Dalton Brothers Gang, who were outlaws that gained an infamous reputation by
robbing banks in the United States. After completing a large heist in Kansas City,
Winnall Dalton fled to El Salvador. While in El Salvador, Winnall Dalton invested in
coffee plantations and had a child with María García, a Salvadoran nurse. Because of his
father’s fortune, Roque Dalton was able to attend a number of Jesuit schools in El
Salvador but was alienated from his classmates due to his mother’s social class
background.21
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After he spent his childhood witnessing firsthand the deeply divided social classes
in El Salvador, Roque Dalton went to Chile to study law. Winnall Dalton had apparently
hoped that by sending Roque to Jesuit schools that he would become more conservative.
However, that backfired terribly, and it was in the university that Roque Dalton became
increasingly interested in reading Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, as well as others, and
solidified his knowledge of socialists texts that would “later develop into solidly Marxist
positions.”22 In 1966, Roque Dalton attended a meeting of the International Communist
Party in Russia and, prior to returning to Cuba and then to El Salvador, Dalton spent
some time in Prague. It was in Prague that Roque Dalton met Miguel Mármol, who
would also become a key figure of the Salvadoran revolution.23 It was Dalton’s
conversations with Mármol and his writing on Mármol’s experiences during the Matanza
that initially solidified Dalton’s status as a revolutionary figure in El Salvador.
Mármol was one of the founding members of the Salvadoran Communist Party in
1930 and one of the few individuals who survived the mass slaughter in the 1932
Matanza, even after being arrested under the suspicion that he was one of the communists
who organized the uprising. After being arrested, Mármol was taken, along with eighteen
other prisoners, to a large ditch to be executed by a firing squad. Mármol was shot four
times, “but he survived, largely because so much blood had been spilled on him that as a
police officer was preparing to deliver the coup de grâce a superior told him not to waste
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the bullet.”24 While the two men were in Prague, Miguel Mármol told Roque Dalton his
life story in a series of interviews that Dalton would eventually turn into a book entitled
Miguel Mármol: Los Sucesos de 1932 en El Salvador, or Miguel Mármol: The Events of
1932 in El Salvador. It was in this book that Dalton cemented his own role as a key
revolutionary literary figure, and, through the context of Mármol’s life, analyzed the
events of 1932, the regime of Hernández Martínez, and the roles played by U.S.
intervention and imperialism.25
Roque Dalton was a key figure in the Salvadoran revolution both as an
intellectual leader and a militaristic guerrilla figure. Even while fighting in the ERP,
Dalton continued to write extensive amounts of poetry and prose advocating for the
ideals of revolution that he had become a crucial player in. Additionally, Dalton played a
huge role in influencing his fellow countrymen in moving towards a revolution through
his poetry’s focus on the polarization of Salvadoran society, as well as the deeply
problematic structural issues within El Salvador, that stemmed from the Matanza’s
impact on Salvadoran society. In this way, Roque Dalton’s role in shaping the ideology
of the revolutionary groups that would make up the FMLN was a prime example of the
significant impact that the Matanza, as well as the international atmosphere of revolution
within Latin America, had on the ultimate beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War.26
Continued State-Sponsored Repression and U.S. Intervention in the 1960s
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The next major period of attempted reform through insurgency, with immediate
repressive counterinsurgent backlash from the Salvadoran military dictatorships in power,
was the late 1950s leading into the early 1960s and John F. Kennedy’s assumption of the
U.S. presidency. The attempts of revolutionaries here are no longer best described as
peasant uprisings, or the small-scale uprisings focused more on local reform that occurred
in January 1932 and resulted in the Matanza. Instead, it was during this time period that
revolutionary groups in El Salvador used insurgency methods that would become the
foundation for the tactics taken by the FMLN during the Civil War. An insurgency can be
loosely defined as “an organized attempt to overthrow a central government or state by
subversion or by force of arms.”27 The pattern of repressive violence that the Salvadoran
military dictatorships had continued since the Matanza, therefore, was engaging in
counterinsurgency in an attempt to maintain the status quo.28 A main contributing factor
as to why the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency strategy was able to be so
successful during this time period was the intervention and aid from the United States.
Although the presence of U.S. intervention was felt in El Salvador, and in Latin America
in general, much earlier than Kennedy’s presidency, it was at this point in time that the
U.S. policy towards the insurgencies occurring throughout Latin America shifted through
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Additionally, it was under Kennedy that
the official Cold War anti-communism strategy “became one of not only
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counterinsurgency, but also support for democracy” through the use of “modernization
theory.”
The adaptation of traditional Cold War strategies of the United States to fit the
Central American context changed over time but, by the time of the start of El Salvador’s
Civil War in 1980, the use of rhetoric detailing the need for the prevention of the spread
of communism was prominent. In El Salvador, the United States’ Cold War strategy was
based in part on “modernization theory,” which combined the traditional elements of
counterinsurgency through military and economic aid with the promotion of democracy,
economic growth, and security. Modernization theory countered dependency theory
which had advocated that Latin American underdevelopment was a result of global
development where resources flow from a “periphery” of poor and underdeveloped states
to a “core” of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former.
Modernization theory, under the Kennedy administration, advocated that “to ensure
protection from both internal and external subversion, states needed capable militaries
and police forces, and the United States could and should assist anticommunist
governments to arm and train their security forces.”29 Although this counterinsurgency
approach was adapted gradually over time, by the time that the Salvadoran Civil War was
in full swing, the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush approached
Cold War foreign policy regarding Central America had clearly developed from
Kennedy’s implementation of policies based on modernization theory. The Reagan
administration put great emphasis on the provision of support to ideologically

29

Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 156.

26
compatible, although sometimes highly oppressive, regimes like the Salvadoran junta in
order to contain the perceived Soviet incursion and power in Central America.30
One way that the Kennedy administration pursued modernization theory in El
Salvador was through the beginning of the Alliance for Progress. Although many public
justifications were given by the Kennedy administration for instituting this “benevolent”
and aid-oriented program, part of the underlying motivation for Kennedy to pursue the
promotion of internal order in El Salvador, and Latin America in general, was to avoid
the possibility of “another Cuba.”31 In implementing the Alliance for Progress,
“economic development” became one of two main facets because “its logic held that new
government opportunities for the poor would reduce social grievances and the appeal of
calls for revolutionary change…and it was thought that economic growth would create an
expanding middle class, which was seen as the bastion of liberal democratic values.”32
The second facet of the Alliance for Progress was closely intertwined with that of
economic development, and it relied on U.S. military aid programs that would
“professionalize” the Salvadoran military in order to prepare it “to combat Castro-style
guerrillas.”33 This professionalization of the Salvadoran Armed Forces was seen largely
as a preventative step to ensure the protection of the new economic development
programs.34
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Ultimately, the Kennedy administration, as well as the following presidential
administrations leading up to the start of El Salvador’s
Civil War, saw the Alliance for Progress as a means to prevent revolutionary insurgency.
However, the prevention of insurgency through the Alliance for Progress would
ultimately fail because of internal forces within El Salvador’s provocation of the
Salvadoran Civil War. Even though the exacerbation of existing internal strife during the
1960s and into the 1970s built largely off of the same structural issues of the Matanza,
the preventative counterinsurgency preparation of the Salvadoran military by the United
States would just exacerbate the violence leading up to and including the start of the
twelve-year Civil War.35
Over the next few years, the Alliance for Progress programs that were intended to
decrease the need for a revolutionary insurgency in El Salvador became increasingly less
and less effective. By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the attempt to placate the call for
reform through “economic development” failed because it did not address the structural
problem with El Salvador’s economy: the continued control by a few economic elites of
an export-crop economy. Ultimately, the worsening economic conditions “forced the
majority of the population into an untenable and deteriorating economic situation by the
late 1970s.”36 Additionally, because the military dictatorship political structure did not
allow for any space in which the peasantry could participate and institute potential
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reforms, the potential to inspire change through democratic means seemed impossible
and many believed that an insurgent revolution was the only option left. Throughout the
1970s, an increasing amount of revolutionary groups had emerged and grown in
prominence throughout El Salvador’s society. However, it was not until 1979-1980 that
the unification of these opposition groups, and the creation of the FMLN, that this idea of
a revolutionary insurgency would change into a real possibility.
The Creation and Rise of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was symbolically named after
Farabundo Martí, who was captured, tried, and condemned to death for “treason and
conspiracy” for his role in the peasant uprising of 1932. Martí also founded the Partido
Comunista de El Salvador, or the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) in 1930, and,
for this reason, became the “figurehead and martyr of the Salvadoran revolutionary
movement.”37 All of the guerrilla groups that would eventually combine under the
umbrella organization of the FMLN in the 1970s can trace their roots back to Communist
Party of El Salvador (PCS). However, despite ultimately unifying under the FMLN, it is
important to note that all of these groups maintained their own autonomous and unique
group identity and leadership. The FMLN was a “front,” which means it was a “coalition
of various organizations, united for a specific goal and in which each retains its own
identity.”38 The main components that made up the FMLN were the Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance (RN), the
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Central American Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRTC), and the Salvadoran Communist
Party (PCS). The FMLN combined a couple major groups that had been fighting against
the oppressive Salvadoran government in the mid-1960s. All of the guerrilla and
revolutionary groups that would eventually combine under the umbrella organization of
the FMLN in the 1970s can trace their roots back to the Communist Party of El Salvador
(PCES). One of the most significant of these groups was the People’s Revolutionary
Army (ERP) which drew much of their ideological and tactical foundations from the
revolutionary Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The political faction was led by Roque
Dalton.39
These five groups that would ultimately come together in October 1980, although
all leftist organizations, were far from a heterogeneous group and disagreed on almost
everything, including the strategy that the FMLN should pursue in its insurgency.
However, the event that ultimately allowed these individual groups to pursue
revolutionary change successfully, at least to a degree, was their unification and “its
ability to present itself to the world as a single entity and subsume the divisive
factionalism between the groups.”40 Although this unification is largely attributed to the
perceived need for a revolution, and the recognition that a unified front would have a
better chance against the U.S.-backed counterinsurgent Salvadoran military forces, the
international influence and mediation role of Cuba played a significant role in the original
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process of unification. An additional connection between Cuba and the five revolutionary
groups that would unify under the FMLN was that in 1961, Dalton was sentenced to
death for inciting a communist revolution. He fled to Cuba where his personal communist
ideals were cemented along with his belief in the need for revolution in his homeland. In
Cuba, Dalton witnessed and took part in the Cuban Revolution, where he learned
guerrilla tactics and received military training that he would bring with upon his return to
El Salvador in 1965.41
In the period leading up to the October 1980 unification of the revolutionary
groups, Cuba played a large role in mediating the conflicts between the groups and
ultimately creating the space conducive of unification. As Andrea Oñate pointed out in
her article entitled “The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Salvadoran Civil
War, 1981-1992,” Cuban leadership pointed out three compelling points to the factions of
Salvadoran revolutionary groups. First, unification of the revolutionary groups would
make opposing the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military much more feasible, especially
following the ramp up of repression and violence against insurgencies following the
success of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua. The second
decisively compelling argument in favor of unification was an analysis of the path taken
by the FSLN. Like in El Salvador, the revolutionary insurgent groups in Nicaragua began
as disunified organizations. However, following the unification of these organizations
with Cuban support, the FSLN quickly was able to mount an offensive and overthrow
Nicaragua’s military dictatorship. The third, and final, argument made by the Cuban
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leadership was by far “the most alluring incentive for unity: extensive Cuban support
contingent on this unity.”42 The leaders of the individual revolutionary organizations,
therefore, agreed that a Cuban-backed insurgency would provide them the best chance
against a U.S.-backed counterinsurgency, and so the groups finally unified under the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.
Systemic Socioeconomic Inequalities and the Salvadoran Junta
The systemic socioeconomic inequality in El Salvador was sustained through the
prevention of land reform by a militarized and authoritarian political system that was
designed to benefit the small upper class of the agriculture-export industries. Although El
Salvador relied on multiple various agricultural products to sustain their agriculturalexport economy, after the middle of the nineteenth century, coffee became the most
important. In order to encourage productivity and increase the export and trade with the
global community, including the United States, peasant farmers and the middle-class
were forced by the government to sell their land to the agrarian elites to create more
prosperous coffee estates. This marginalization of the lower classes by the Salvadoran
government and the economic elites began a new wave of socioeconomic inequality in El
Salvador that would continue in one way or another until the Cold War era. Up until the
late-1970s, when the build up towards a revolution and FMLN-led insurgency was
apparent, the violence in El Salvador was based on these socioeconomic inequalities.
This form of violence is referred to as ‘institutionalized violence’ because its purpose was
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to serve the social, economic, and political institutions that benefitted the economic
elites.43
In 1980, the Salvadoran government under the Christian Democratic Party
proposed a program of agrarian reform that would benefit a majority of the nonagricultural-elite population and was founded in decades of reform advocacy dating back
to the nineteenth century that was popular with the lower and middle classes of
Salvadoran society but was ultimately squashed by the political and economic elites. If
the agrarian reform was allowed to continue, the socioeconomic status of the coffee elite,
as well as their control of a significant amount of El Salvador’s land, would be seriously
threatened. This led the coffee elite, along with their allies in the military and their allies
in Washington, to start an attempt to block the agrarian reform by any means necessary.
Because of the large-scale aid of the Salvadoran military, as well as the comparatively
smaller U.S. aid, the coffee elite were able to overthrow the 1980 government and
establish a new, agricultural-export elite sympathizing junta`. In turn, this outraged the
middle-class revolutionaries that made up the FMLN and marked the official beginning
of the Salvadoran Civil War. Therefore, the argument that scholars, like Diana Villiers
Negroponte, make through this analytical approach to the Salvadoran revolution and
Civil War is founded in two contentions that challenge the dominant Cold War battle for
ideological hegemony and democracy promotion explanation. First, Negroponte contends
that the internal actors, as opposed to external intervening actors, were the main forces in
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the Salvadoran Civil War. In addition to recognizing the active role played by Salvadoran
institutions, more and more scholars like Negroponte are putting a greater focus on the
role of socioeconomic inequality and various forms of violence prior to and during the
Salvadoran Civil War in order to show the evolution of violence in the postwar period.44
With the historic roots of Roque Dalton’s People’s Revolutionary Army and
continued Cuban support, the consolidation of revolutionaries under the FMLN’s
umbrella alliance in the period leading up to the Salvadoran Civil War made the reality of
a successful social revolution in El Salvador appear possible. However, the FMLN
underestimated the extent to which the United States-backed, Christian Democratic
Party-run Salvadoran government, or the junta, and their counterinsurgent tactics would
go to suppress the FMLN’s insurgency.45 The junta sought to “use some combination of
political, administrative, military, psychological, and civic actions to maintain the status
quo against an insurgent force that is trying to upend that order.”46 This counterinsurgent
response of the Salvadoran central government and El Salvador’s Armed Forces against
the FMLN insurgency was financially and militarily supported greatly by the United
States and, specifically, the Ronald Reagan administration. Support for the massive level
of aid provided to the Salvadoran junta was framed through both traditional Cold War
rhetoric promoting hegemony and, especially in the later years, through the argument that
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the aid allowed for the nation of El Salvador to move towards better democracy through
more fair elections, human rights protections, and a professional military.47
The adaptation of traditional Cold War strategies of the United States to fit the
Central American context changed over time but, by the time of the start of El Salvador’s
Civil War in 1980, the use of rhetoric detailing the need for the prevention of the spread
of communism was prominent. In El Salvador, the United States implemented a form of
John F. Kennedy’s “modernization through militaries” approach to anticommunism. This
combined the traditional elements of counterinsurgency through military and economic
aid with the promotion of democracy, economic growth, and security. This led the
Kennedy administration, and the following administrations in one form or another, to
stress that “to ensure protection from both internal and external subversion, states needed
capable militaries and police forces, and the United States could and should assist
anticommunist governments to arm and train their security forces.”48 Although this
counterinsurgency approach was adapted gradually over time, by the time that the
Salvadoran Civil War was in full swing, the administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush approached Cold War foreign policy regarding Central America
under a clear influence of Kennedy’s modernization theory. The Reagan administration
put great emphasis on the provision of support to ideologically compatible, although
sometimes highly oppressive, regimes like the Salvadoran junta in order to contain the
perceived Soviet incursion and power in Central America.49

47

Crandall, Dirty Wars, 315-319; Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 24.
Crandall, Dirty Wars, 156.
49
Pee, Democracy Promotion, National Security and Strategy, 49; Tulchin, Latin America in International
Politics, 8; Crandall, Dirty Wars, 307; John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker,
Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015);
48

35
The United States justified intervention by saying it was a means to promote
democracy. However, there were also other underlying rationales used while determining
what the Cold War foreign policy towards El Salvador would be. For example, the
promotion of democracy and economic reform over the adoption of communism would,
in the long run, be more favorable to and protective of the US economic interests in El
Salvador. Ultimately, the full scope of the intervention of the United States in Salvadoran
affairs, as well as how this intervention was perceived by Salvadoran citizens, is summed
up in Roque Dalton’s poem entitled “O.E.A.” In this poem, Dalton writes “…Y el
Presidente de los Estados Unidos es más Presidente de mi país que el Presidente de mi
país.”50 This translates to say that the “United State’s President’s more my country’s
President than my country’s President is.” This poem shows how the FMLN and its
leaders viewed the role of the U.S. and that was as an indirect but powerful neo-colonial
power. This point of view was justified through the experience of Nicaragua and other
Central American countries that had gone through similar Cold War-era revolutions and
faced a state-sponsored counterrevolution supported by the United States. Although the
United States did not attempt to directly control the Salvadoran government, the indirect
hegemonic influence, military training, and financial aid provided by the United States
allowed for, as Dalton perceives, pseudo-control of the Salvadoran state.
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Following the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War, it appeared to the Reagan
administration and the United States that the American values of democracy and
anticommunism were in danger due to the FMLN-led insurgency. The U.S. therefore
justified their intervention in El Salvador, as well as their passive tolerance of the
countless human rights violations committed by the junta and the military, by arguing
that the levels of violence would be worse if the FMLN was to rise to power. However, to
most Salvadorans, the Civil War was not considered to be yet another proxy battlefield
for determining the ideological supremacy of the Cold War. The Salvadoran Civil War,
in the eyes of a large amount of the citizenry, was founded in revolting against El
Salvador’s history of social, economic, and political inequality and the institutionalized
violence these inequalities brought.51
Although the FMLN did argue for the overthrow of the junta, the revolution was
not, as the United States government believed, an attempt to rid El Salvador of
democracy. Rather, it was the FMLN’s motivations of a reduction in social, economic,
and political inequality, the marginalization these inequalities caused, and an end to the
institutionalized violence perpetrated by the governing junta through socioeconomic and
political reform through the creation of a more reliable democracy to end the agriculturalelite’s control of El Salvador. In order to rally global support and to clear up any
misperceptions as to the motivations of the FMLN in the Salvadoran revolution, the
FMLN issued a document entitled “El Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic
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Revolutionary Victory.” In this report, the FMLN laid out a brief history of El Salvador
as a means of providing background for why the FMLN emerged and what the intended
principles of reform were to be implemented following the success of the revolution’s
launch of the “Final Offensive” in January 1981. The “Final Offensive,” as designed by
the FMLN’s newly untied guerrilla umbrella organization, intended to capitalize on the
public’s dissatisfaction with the recently failed agrarian reform in order to trigger a
popular insurrection to overthrow the repressive junta government.
In “El Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory”, the
FMLN argues that the history of El Salvador “can be condensed in terms of repression,
murder, torture, prison, exile, and social marginalization,” and that the junta’s prevention
of the implementation of the 1980 agrarian reform was the latest iteration of the political
violence committed against the citizens of El Salvador.52 The FMLN also used this
document to clarify to the global community that, despite the “distortion” of the conflict
in the international press, the FMLN was not “a terrorist movement seeking violence for
violence’s sake.”53 The document went on to specifically call out the role played by the
United States government as “dangerous and irresponsible” with detrimental
consequences of the intervention, including the prolonging the conflict unnecessarily and
the “raising of its cost in terms of human lives.”54 Despite these clarifications and
explanations of the FMLN’s intended purpose and ultimate goals of revolution, as well as
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the explicit condemnation of U.S. intervention as a proxy battlefield for the Cold War
ideological battle, the United States continued, and amplified, aid to the Salvadoran junta
government and military forces. This caused the so-called “Final Offensive” of 1981 to
ultimately fail in overthrowing the government, and so the period of massive political
violence caused by the Salvadoran Civil War continued until 1992.55
The FMLN’s First “Final Offensive”
In January of 1981, after only about three months of being a unified revolutionary
insurgent front, the FMLN launched their first “Final Offensive.” Prior to the actual
insurgent acts of the “Final Offensive,” the FMLN issued a report entitled “El Salvador
On the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory.” In this document, the FMLN
wrote “a brief report on El Salvador, its political process, human rights violations and the
war of extermination,”56 starting with the 1932 Matanza. This document was also meant
to describe the composition of the FMLN straight from the source, and to show “the basic
principles of the future democratic revolutionary government that we intend to establish
in the near future.”57 However, because the first “Final Offensive” happened so quickly
after unification, the revolutionary groups within the FMLN did not yet fully know how
to effectively work together while mounting a unified insurgency, which was ultimately
one of the main reasons for the failure of this “Final Offensive.” Additionally, in the
beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War, many of the revolutionaries believed, due to the
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recent triumph of the FSLN in Nicaragua, that the insurrection would quickly triumph
following unification of the FMLN and the launching of the “Final Offensive.” In fact,
the “Final Offensive” was scheduled to take place so soon after unification so that the
FMLN “would be able to seize power before the hawkish Reagan administration took
office a few weeks later.”58 Unfortunately, this backfired and began the violent and
drawn out twelve-year Civil War.
Another reason that the first “Final Offensive” failed was that the FMLN
underestimated the willingness of the U.S. to intervene in internal affairs of their nation
after the 1979 socialist revolution of Nicaragua. A declassified U.S. Department of State
Memorandum between Abraham Rodriguez, a former Salvadoran presidential candidate
from the U.S.-supported Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and U.S. Ambassador to El
Salvador, Frank J. Devine, documents their conversation about the potentially dangerous
similarities between Nicaragua and El Salvador. In fact, the memorandum revealed that
the diplomats feared El Salvador might be “potentially worse than the crisis in Nicaragua
because unlike Nicaragua where dissent is basically focused on one man and his family
dynasty, political polarization in El Salvador is based on growing antipathy toward the
entire civilian/military establishment which has governed the country since 1932.”59 A
month later, a message to the Assistant Secretary of State was sent that contained
Ambassador Devine’s further assessment of the situation, and stated that “there is going
to be political change, probably made more likely by events in Nicaragua.”60 This
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acknowledgement of the potential for insurgency a whole year and a half prior to the
FMLN launching their first “Final Offensive” showed that the United States was not only
worried about the insurgency in El Salvador following the successful path of Nicaragua,
but that the United States, and their allies in the Salvadoran counterinsurgency
government and military, had time to, and did, ramp up their counterinsurgent
preparation to effectively combat insurgency when, not if, it came. Additionally, the
FMLN underestimated the extent to which the United States-backed, Christian
Democratic Party-run Salvadoran government, or the junta, and their counterinsurgent
tactics would go to suppress the FMLN’s insurgency.
El Salvador’s history has been a complex interweaving of domestic tensions and
international exasperation of, and intervention because of, said tensions. Starting with the
1932 Matanza and its reactionary, repressive, and extremely violent government
massacre of peasant uprisings, the power of El Salvador’s social, economic, and political
institutions were effectively monopolized through the alliance of the coffee oligarchy and
military dictatorships. The complete and overarching control that this alliance gave to a
few powerful individuals, as well as the standard of violence set by the state-sponsored
Matanza, was maintained up until the start of the twelve-year Salvadoran Civil War in
1980. In other words, by looking at the gradual radicalizing of individual revolutionaries,
like Roque Dalton, and the insurgent revolutionary groups that would ultimately make up
the FMLN, the ongoing legacy of the memory of the 1932 Matanza is apparent.
Additionally, by analyzing the impact of the Alliance for Progress, and its ultimate failure
to prevent an insurgent uprising in El Salvador, the evolution of the structural issues
rooted in the 1932 Matanza, and directly argued against within the FMLN’s justifications
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for mounting its first “Final Offensive,” shows just how far back into El Salvador’s
history the issues being fought over in El Salvador’s Civil War went. Finally, although
the existing domestic economic, social, and political tensions played a large role in the
buildup to El Salvador’s Civil War, the global context in which these tensions existed
further exacerbated El Salvador’s domestic political climate to a point that it was
conducive to the beginning of an insurgency and a large-scale Civil War. The United
States intervention in El Salvador, driven largely by Cold War-era tensions and the recent
success of the Nicaraguan insurgency, played an influential role in the effectiveness of
the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency, while the financial aid and influence of
Cuba provided a necessary incentive for the unification of the insurgent groups under the
FMLN. However, it was the combination of all of these deeply complex domestic and
international tensions, actors, and organizations that ultimately led to the beginning of the
Salvadoran Civil War.
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Chapter Two: Salvadoran Immigration and Responses in the U.S.
Overall, the period following the initial 1980 beginning of El Salvador’s Civil
War up until the 1992 Peace Accords was a turbulent time for both Salvadorans in El
Salvador and the newly transnational communities of Salvadorans in the United States.
This humanitarian crisis and fairly profound change in immigration patterns from El
Salvador to the United States began the Salvadoran Diaspora, and this moment in history
continues to impact legal, social, political, and humanitarian policies, organizations, and
debates in both the United States and El Salvador presently. Although most of this
“blowback” from U.S. immigration and refugee policy has been portrayed negatively in
recent media, especially under the Trump administration and regarding the “Salvadoran”
gang MS-13, the upsurge in the creation of Salvadoran activist organizations and the
establishment of transnational communities, like that of MacArthur Park in Los Angeles,
that revolved around an evolving, yet distinct, Salvadoran identity is proof of a positive
form of blowback that does not get its due recognition in the mainstream public
consciousness. This activism of community organizations, like the Los Angeles
Sanctuary Movement, El Rescate, and CARECEN, combined religious-based
humanitarianism, preexisting activism that had been persecuted in El Salvador, and the
few U.S.-based Central American-focused ideals in order to overcome a bias in U.S.
immigration policy that excluded Salvadorans fleeing persecution from rightfully
claiming refugee status within the United States. Additionally, although all three
organizations did make an active attempt in the early years to address the root causes of
the political violence that led to an increase in Salvadoran refugees, the main focus
became the Los Angeles communities in which the organizations were located. By
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focusing on the arrival city of Los Angeles and, more specifically, the MacArthur Park
neighborhood in which a majority of Salvadoran refugees arrived, settled, and established
lives in, these activist organizations were able to take the relatively small amounts of
funding available to them and most efficiently, and directly, provide legal, social,
political, and humanitarian aid and representation to the Salvadoran communities. Also,
by creating a welcoming and helpful arrival city in which the refugees were able to set
down permanent roots, the activist organizations contributed to the creation of a
community within MacArthur Park that had a common history in and memory of the
Salvadoran Civil War and El Salvador in general. This allowed the refugees to maintain
their distinct Salvadoran identity and culture while, at the same time, created a new
transnational identity and community of Salvadoran-Americans in Los Angeles that
would continue to grow while still maintaining their connection with their country of
origin, El Salvador. Therefore, the 1980-1992 was the foundational period for both the
hyphenated transnational community of Salvadoran-Americans as well as the first
grouping of major activist organizations focused on Salvadorans in the United States that
would continue to grow in influence and scope, as well as influence the establishment of
new, similar organizations, in the years following the 1992 Peace Accords in order to
address the evolving needs of the Salvadoran-American community.
Immigration from El Salvador to the United States prior to the 1980s was
relatively small. The Salvadoran Civil War in 1980 sparked a new pattern of migration
resulting from Salvadoran civilians fleeing political violence and persecution hoping to
claim asylum or be given refugee status. This Salvadoran Diaspora continued throughout
the twelve-year period of El Salvador’s Civil War and contributed to the creation of
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distinctly Salvadoran communities within urban spaces in the United States, like Los
Angeles and Washington, D.C. This diaspora also gave rise to activist community
organizations that advocated for the recognition of the Salvadoran immigrants as refugees
because this designation would provide a legally recognizable status for the Salvadorans
arriving in the United States. Additionally, following the implementation of Peace
Accords by a United Nations-sponsored Truth Commission, these Los Angeles-based
activist community organizations evolved alongside of the needs of the Salvadoran
community by shifting their advocacy focus away from recognition of Salvadorans as
political refugees to the recognition of the members of these established SalvadoranAmerican communities as legal permanent residents. Through the activism of these
community-based organizations, Los Angeles became one of, if not the, primary arrival
city for Salvadorans fleeing political violence in El Salvador during the 1980s and 1990s,
which led to the proliferation of said activist community organizations focused on the
provision of aid to Salvadorans in Los Angeles, a growing Los Angeles-based group of
Salvadoran activists, and the creation of a transnational Salvadoran identity and
community.
Definitions of the Salvadoran Diaspora and Transnationalism61
Although the term “Salvadoran Diaspora” has been accepted within the academic
community as a way to describe the pattern of migration out of El Salvador to the United
States following the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980, the identification of
Salvadoran migration to other countries as a diaspora only began in the late 1990s and
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early 2000s. However, as diaspora is usually understood “as a collectivity of individuals
who have been displaced from a common origin, and who are now dispersed in a variety
of locations,” the term fits relatively well with the Salvadoran experience.62 The
Salvadoran Diaspora, in turn, has led to the transnationalism of the Salvadoran national
identity. Transnationalism, or “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement,”
is evident in the case of El Salvador and is epitomized through the example of the
Salvadoran experience in Los Angeles.63 Additionally, although migration from El
Salvador to the United States had existed, and was likely to continue to exist, prior to the
Salvadoran Civil War, the drastic increase in the Salvadoran out-migration during the
Salvadoran Diaspora was heavily influenced by the push factor of the start of the Civil
War and the subsequent political violence, persecution, and economic instability.64
Political Violence in El Salvador and the Start of the Salvadoran Diaspora
As mentioned in Chapter One, the start of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980 was
characterized by a still ununified FMLN’s launch of the First “Final Offensive” in 1981,
the ultimate failure of this “Final Offensive” to achieve any of its stated goals, and the
overreaction of the Salvadoran junta, or military government, with backing from the
United States, in suppressing this “leftist uprising.” On December 10, 1981, following the
failure of the “Final Offensive” to be final, the pattern of political violence that
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characterized El Salvador’s Civil War begun with a vengeance. The junta had received
notice of a group of FMLN guerrillas gathering in the eastern province of Morozan, and
so El Salvador’s Armed Forces were deployed. Upon arriving, the Salvadoran troops did
not try to distinguish between FMLN insurgents and innocent civilians that lived in the
Morozan province and “deliberately and systematically executed hundreds of men,
women, and children.” This massacre of over 200 civilians, of which more than half were
“children younger than eighteen,” by the Armed Forces of El Salvador became known as
the El Mozote Massacre.65
The conversations about the Civil War changed when it was discovered that a
civilian massacre had taken place and these reports reached the U.S. mainstream press. In
January 1982, international media attention and news reports on the El Mozote Massacre
began. Alma Guillermoprieto, a reporter for The Washington Post, published an article,
“Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing.” She quotes the Salvadoran Ambassador to
the U.S., Ernesto Rivas Gallont, who denied that the Armed Forces of El Salvador would
ever indiscriminately and purposefully massacre women and children. Rivas went on to
confirm that, yes, there was an offensive in Morozan by the Salvadoran Army in
December, but that the actions were against the FMLN guerrilla insurgents and
“definitely not been against the civilian population.” Throughout the rest of the article,
however, Guillermoprieto reports evidence, and retails stories from survivors who had
escaped to a guerrilla-protected camp that witnessed the “alleged” massacre.
Guillermoprieto personally communicated with the FMLN and then traveled to El
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Salvador’s Morozan province to see for herself if there was evidence of the El Mozote
Massacre. She wrote about trekking through deserted towns in the Morozan province
until she finally reached the town of Mozote, which she described as looted, destroyed,
and smelling of “decomposing bodies.” Guillermoprieto stayed in an FMLN guerrilla
encampment and, while there, she was able to interview the few refugees staying in the
guerrilla encampment from Mozote about the violence committed by the Salvadoran
Army. Following the publication of this article, the Reagan administration, Ambassador
Rivas, and the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Deane Hinton, all denied the accuracy of
Guillermoprieto’s article as well as the accuracy of related news reports.66
In May 1982, Hinton, who had been the ambassador to El Salvador since 1981
and was appointed under Ronald Reagan, had still not reached a definite conclusion as to
the involvement of the Salvadoran Army in the massacre of civilians at El Mozote.
However, despite not being able to confirm anything, Hinton adamantly argued some
important points related to the nature of violence in El Salvador. The first, and most
significant, point Hinton argued in this telegram was that even if there were civilian
deaths near Mozote, a systemic massacre by the armed forces was simply impossible.
Secondly, Hinton stated that any possible deaths around El Mozote were not uninvolved
civilians, but rather were guerrilla collaborators. Finally, Hinton stated that if civilian
death did occur, it was nowhere near the amount reported by the international press
because those numbers were inflated by “leftist propaganda.” Hinton’s ultimate message
in this May 1982 telegram to Reagan administration officials in Washington was that the

Alma Guillermoprieto, “Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killings,” The Washington Post (January
27, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/27/salvadoran-peasants-describemass-killing/bc5bb029-b5e6-4282-bd24-35739ea5b38c/?utm_term=.190a1de58163.
66

48
political violence within El Salvador, as embodied by the Salvadoran government and
armed forces, did not target civilians and therefore were not the human rights-violating
“death squads” described in the international press. Because the United States provided
funding and military training to the Salvadoran junta and armed forces in order to aid in
their fight against the FMLN, the desire of the Reagan administration to portray the
Salvadoran junta and armed forces favorably was high.67
Following the virtual denial of the El Mozote Massacre by Deane Hinton and by
senior Reagan administration officials in Washington, news reporters and foreign
correspondents, like Guillermoprieto, began to disregard the government’s reports on the
state of political violence in El Salvador. This especially regarded to information related
to the Salvadoran junta or armed forces due to the underlying motivations of the U.S.
government to paint a favorable picture of the Salvadoran junta. Following the El Mozote
Massacre “credibility gap” that came out of the dramatically different stories told by the
press and by the U.S. government about the same event, journalists and the American
public began to dismiss the government reports as “propaganda.”
In late 1982, on the heels of the conflict between the press and the government on
the “credibility gap” concerning the El Mozote Massacre, Deane Hinton and the
American Embassy in San Salvador attempted to definitively chart the violence in El
Salvador over a twelve-month period starting in September 1980 and ending in
September 1981. This report was titled “A Statistical Framework for Understanding
Violence in El Salvador.” Within this report, Hinton contended that the need for this
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statistical framework was due to “the breakdown of the country’s social and political
systems and the onset of the civil war exacerbated the march toward a society where
violence is the central factor of daily life.”68 This argument that Salvadoran society was,
and would continue to be, an inherently violent state would have made sense if the data
reported by Hinton was viewed in isolation. However, this analysis ignored many key
outside influences to this period of widespread political violence. For example, this report
did not attempt to situate the Salvadoran Civil War in the larger context of the Cold Warera revolutions in Central America or in the context of the Cold War-era U.S.
intervention, and therefore does not acknowledge the role played by the provision of
funding by the United States to the Salvadoran government.
Another problem of Hinton’s report was that the data collected by the Embassy
relied largely on the reports of political violence and murder in the Salvadoran media.
Although the Salvadoran media did report on the political violence and murder in in El
Salvador, the data being reported was very nonspecific and vague. This limited and
nonspecific data from the Salvadoran media led to increased unreliability in the reports
founded on this data being analyzed and reported on from the U.S. Embassy in El
Salvador. This margin of error became even more clear when Hinton compared the
statistical data compiled by the Embassy to two reports compiled by the Central
American institutions of the Central American University and the religious institution
Socorro Jurídico. Both the Central American University and Socorro Jurídico regularly
kept statistical data on the violence in El Salvador. All three various versions of the
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existing data on the levels of political violence and murder in El Salvador had their
individual issues, but the two Central American institutions consistently reported similar
figures to each other while the figures reported by the Embassy were drastically different.
For example, during the month of April 1981, the Embassy reported 493 incidents of
political violence. On the other hand, the Central American University reported 2,341 and
Socorro Jurídico reported 2,311. The margin of error between the Central American
University figures and the Socorro Jurídico figures was understandable, but the same
could not be said for the figures reported by the U.S. Embassy and Deane Hinton. The
credibility of the amount of political violence reported by Hinton was questionable,
especially since this report was compiled so soon after Hinton’s inability to confirm or
deny any real details about the El Mozote Massacre.
This report on the statistics of violence in El Salvador did, however, contain some
information that provided insight on the nature of violence in El Salvador’s society. For
example, this report supported the argument that political violence negatively impacted a
greater number of Salvadoran youths than any other demographic. In his analysis of the
data, Hinton stated that it was “without question” that it was the “young who are the
principal victims here.” This negative impact of the political violence of the Salvadoran
Civil War on the youth stemmed from the original issues of social, political, and
economic inequalities, as well as the subsequent marginalization, that the FMLN’s initial
“Final Offensive” strove to combat in 1981. Due to the twelve-years of intense political
violence in El Salvador, and the ultimate failure of the revolution, the underlying
inequalities were never wholly solved – in fact, it is easy to see that they worsened.
Definitional Differences and the Exclusion of Salvadoran Refugees
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During the 1980s, the Salvadoran migrants fleeing the aforementioned political
violence and persecution of El Salvador’s Civil War were seen, under U.S. immigration
policy, as economic migrants and not political refugees or asylees. Therefore, the U.S.
government’s position on the Salvadoran migrants, many of whom had entered the
United States without legal authorization, was that they were “economic immigrants who
deserved to be deported to El Salvador rather than persecution victims who deserved
political asylum in the United States.”69 This stance was especially controversial because
migrants from “unfriendly” Central American nations, like Nicaragua, where the U.S.backed regime was not in power, were recognized as refugees. For Salvadorans and
Guatemalans, who were fleeing nations under the control of U.S.-supported governments,
it would have been anathema to U.S. policy in the region to declare them as fleeing a
hostile government. The failure of the U.S. government to provide a legal and accessible
designation for the Salvadoran migrants fleeing persecution in the 1980s combined with
increasing political violence there and an increasing number of Salvadoran activists
seeking refuge in the U.S. led to the initial establishment of community organizations in
Los Angeles. At first, these focused specifically on providing aid to the growing
community of Salvadoran refugees. These community organizations began to work in the
1980s to secure legal protection for Salvadoran and, to a lesser extent, Guatemalan
refugees. This was largely due to the interest of the Salvadoran activists arriving in Los
Angeles prioritizing providing aid to their homeland and their fellow Salvadorans
arriving in Los Angeles. Therefore, according to sociocultural anthropologist Susan
Bibler Coutin, the early beginnings of many of these community organizations and
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nonprofits came out of “a solidarity movement composed of religious groups, political
activists, and legal advocates [that] sought to establish that the United States government
was discriminating against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers due to foreign
policy considerations.”70 Additionally, many of these early manifestations of community
organizations, nonprofits, and solidarity movements were founded by the educated and
previously organized Salvadoran activists who had already fled the political violence and
persecution of El Salvador with the ultimate goal of establishing legalization programs
for Salvadorans fleeing the war as well as advocated to address one of the main root
causes of the political violence of the period, the ongoing U.S. military aid to the
Salvadoran government.71
During the Civil War, Salvadorans that opposed both sides of the conflict, the
FMLN and the Salvadoran junta, fled the civil strife within El Salvador to the United
States, seeking protection through asylum. This pattern of migration that began, grew,
and remained consistent throughout the early 1980s from El Salvador to the United States
continued following the official ending of the Cold War, the signing of the Salvadoran
Peace Accords in 1992, and well into the 2000s and 2010s. Under the 1980 Immigration
and Nationality Act, political asylum could be granted to migrants that establish a “wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”72 This definition adopted by the United
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States was very similar to, and founded in, the definition created by the 1951 United
Nations Refugee Convention that sought to define and provide new protections for a class
of migrants fleeing the violence of World War Two. The United Nation’s broad
definition of “refugee” are “persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of
feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have
seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection.”73 The
1951 Refugee Convention details the various conditions under which a person could
claim refugee status in the eyes of the United Nations but, for the most part, the U.N.
High Commission on Refugees, or UNHCR, keeps the definition purposefully broad and
generalized so that it can be easily applicable to future refugee situations, like those of
Cold War-era Central America and, more specifically, Civil War-era El Salvador.74
Almost immediately following the U.S. adoption of this definition of refugee and
asylee, the U.S. role in Cold War Central America entered a newly intense stage.
Between 1981 and 1990, “almost one million Salvadorans fled repression at home” and
made the dangerous journey to the United States to seek asylum. However, because of the
U.S. involvement in the conflict in El Salvador, and the support it pledged for the
Salvadoran government, the United States government classified these fleeing migrants
as “economic migrants” that were ineligible for political asylum status. If the United
States would have granted asylum to individuals fleeing El Salvador, that would imply
that the United States was acknowledging that the potential Salvadoran asylees were
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oppressed and, because the United States had an explicit role in supporting the
Salvadoran junta financially and militarily, it would have been viewed as political suicide
to label these regimes as oppressive. This was where the acute differences between the
United Nations and United States definitions of who qualified as a refugee or asylee
really mattered. For example, while, under the United Nations definition, Salvadorans
fleeing the political violence and routine pattern of massacre that characterized the early
Salvadoran Civil War were individuals who “feared persecution, conflict, generalized
violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order,” the U.S.
definition was ever-so-slightly different and, therefore, exclusionary towards
Salvadorans. Rather than just adopting the UNHCR definitions’ “feared persecution,” the
U.S. definition of refugee included the phrase “well-founded fear of persecution.” This
small, but significant, change required those fleeing persecution and claiming refugee or
asylee status to have substantial evidence of state-sponsored repression or violence
against an “immutable” personal characteristic, like “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”75 Not only is this “wellfounded fear of persecution” immensely difficult for anyone to obtain whilst fleeing a
repressive regime, the ability of Salvadoran refugees to show evidence of the Salvadoran
state’s political violence was made even more difficult due to the active refusal of the
United States government to acknowledge the repressive role of the U.S.-backed
Salvadoran government and military, as shown through the vague and inconclusive
nature of Ambassador Deane Hinton’s reports.76 Therefore, from the beginning,
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Salvadorans entering the United States during the early 1980s faced huge roadblocks and
the need for non-governmental assistance and aid for this growing community became
increasingly clear. This need, in conjunction with the portion of Salvadoran refugees
already involved in activist networks in El Salvador, led to the rise of Salvadoran-led and
focused activist groups in the United States dedicated to providing aid to this new
distinctly Salvadoran community.77
The United Nations as an outside international perspective on the human rights
situation in El Salvador was important in the debate over the status of Salvadorans
arriving in the United States and claiming refugee status. A similar outside contribution
on the monitoring of human rights violations in El Salvador was made by Amnesty
International’s annual reports. In these reports, Amnesty International acknowledged the
wrongdoings of groups on both sides of the Civil War, which was an important outside
contribution from an international organization in adding to the reports from the United
States, the United Nations, and El Rescate, which will be mentioned in depth in
upcoming sections. In the 1985 report, Amnesty International wrote that they “continued
to be concerned about massive human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and
prolonged detention without trial, torture, “disappearances,” and individual and mass
extrajudicial executions.”78 The report went on to acknowledge the role of the FMLN in
related human rights violations and persecution, but then emphasized that the
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overwhelming majority of the human rights violations occurring in El Salvador came
from either official government forces or “death squads” made up of both military and
civilian supporters of the Salvadoran junta. This claim was supported by Amnesty
International’s inclusion of a quote from a 1984 report entitled Extrajudicial Executions
in El Salvador: Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Examine Post-mortem and
Investigative Procedures in Political Killings that found “that many of the estimated
40,000 people killed in political violence in the preceding five years had been murdered
by government forces who openly dumped mutilated corpses in an apparent effort to
terrorize the population.”79
This general sentiment on the human rights violations in El Salvador being
committed largely by the Salvadoran junta and military in an officially supported
capacity was continued in the 1987 Amnesty International Report. However, the main
difference between the 1985 and 1987 reports was that in 1985 the compilation of
information by Amnesty International workers was relatively unhindered. The amount of
information contained in the 1987 report and the “collection of human rights abuses,”
however, “was hindered by a wave of arrests of human rights workers and by interference
in the work of journalists.”80 This increased repression of human rights workers in El
Salvador was representative of the increasing levels of violence and persecution of
individuals and groups outside of those in support of the Salvadoran junta, including the
FMLN, and echoed the UN’s advocation for the recognition of Salvadorans fleeing a
“well-founded fear of persecution” as refugees. Additionally, the information compiled in
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these reports, as well as other Amnesty International reports, spanning the years of the
Salvadoran Civil War gave further fuel to activism in the United States for the adaptation
of U.S. refugee and immigration policy to make the official refugee status more inclusive
of and accessible to those arriving in the U.S. during the Salvadoran Diaspora.
Salvadoran Activism in the United States
The term “activism,” as it is used in this paper, is necessarily broad and
encompasses a wider range of activist and advocacy-focused individuals and groups.
Activism, as a form of advocacy, in this context consists of “ongoing efforts, often by
members of nongovernmental organizations, to influence policy in a particular area.”81
Additionally, the term “activism,” in the context of this thesis, should not be read with the
negative connotation typically associated with the term in the United States. In Latin
America, the word “activism” or “activist” can be used in a more neutral way than the
militant way that it is traditionally used in the United States. In this case, the policy area
on which activism is focused is immigration and the rights of refugee and immigrant
groups in the United States. Additionally, in this context, the terms “activism/activist,”
“community organizations,” and “nonprofit organizations” are often used
interchangeably, and usually refer to groups with the same or similar goals. For example,
a community organization like the ones that will be discussed are often also nonprofits
that are a group of individuals with the activist goal of providing aid to the U.S.-based
Salvadoran communities and influencing policy regarding the legal recognition and rights
of said Salvadoran community.82 For the sake of this paper, the focus will be on the early
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activist groups that emerged in Los Angeles following the initial start of the Salvadoran
Diaspora including, but by no means limited to, the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement,
El Rescate, and the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN).83
The Central American Sanctuary Movement officially began on March 24, 1982
in Tucson, Arizona under Jim Corbett, a Quaker, and John Fife, a Presbyterian minister,
when the two were caught illegally escorting undocumented Salvadoran refugees into the
United States and then threated by INS officials for sheltering these people in churches
and homes of those who supported the movement.84 The Sanctuary Movement as a social
movement quickly grew and spread beyond solely Tucson and Catholic religion-based
sanctuary to other major U.S. cities, like Los Angeles, and other religious institutions,
such as Jewish synagogues, as well as non-religious institutions such as colleges and
entire cities, and also grew to provide aid to refugees from Central American nations.
Additionally, the start date of the Central American Sanctuary Movement – March 24,
1982 – was symbolically significant to the increasingly transnational Salvadoran identity
within the United States and the growing Salvadoran communities because it was the
second anniversary of the politically motivated assassination of the Salvadoran
archbishop Monsignor Oscar Romero. Msgr. Romero was a saint-like figure in the eyes
of the Salvadoran community. Additionally, as of October of 2018, Romero has been
officially recognized by the Catholic Church as a saint, further showing his significance
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as a martyr for much of Latin America. Therefore, the beginning of the Sanctuary
Movement occurring on this anniversary carried both real and symbolic weight in the
eyes of Central American activists.85
The combination of the beginning of the Sanctuary Movement and the founding
of activist organizations like El Rescate and CARECEN in Los Angeles at the same time
led to the full scope of social and political advocacy on behalf of gaining refugee status
for the community of Salvadoran immigrants. However, it was the Sanctuary
Movement’s ability to transcend religiously-based humanitarian concerns and lead to the
beginning of a widespread questioning of the social and political conditions that were the
root causes of why Salvadoran immigrants indeed qualified for refugee status, and why,
under U.S. policy, this group was not recognized as such. Even though the Sanctuary
Movement in Los Angeles was one of many programs that advocated on the behalf of
Salvadoran refugees, it is widely accepted that it had a profound effect, especially “with
respect to its most immediate, humanitarian goals” of protecting Salvadoran refugees
from deportation and providing aid to this growing community.86 Additionally, many of
the activists that got their start with the Sanctuary Movement have continued fighting for
the provision of humanitarian aid to asylum-seekers and migrants making the dangerous
journey from Central America to the U.S. border. For example, Fife, who I mentioned
was one of the founders of the 1980s Sanctuary Movement, more recently helped found
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the group No More Deaths in 2004 as the same founding beliefs of the Sanctuary
Movement. In an article for the Los Angeles Times, Fife is quoted on the topic of No
More Deaths, saying, in language similar to that of the Sanctuary Movement, that “We
have every legal right to provide humanitarian aid in a human disaster like the thousands
of deaths that have occurred here in the Sonoran Desert” after being recently charged,
prosecuted, and told to desist “interfering” in what is the U.S. Border Patrol’s job,
according to the federal prosecutor.87

Origins and Early Years of El Rescate and CARECEN
Another important unintended consequence that resulted from the U.S.
intervention in El Salvador’s Civil War and the resulting Salvadoran Diaspora was the
increasing focus on the rights of Central American refugees and immigrants within the
United States. The upsurge in immigration out of Central America to the United States
began in the 1970s due to similarly escalating conflicts in Nicaragua and Guatemala, and
further increased with the humanitarian crisis caused by the political violence of El
Salvador’s Civil War in the 1980s. The individual identities of these refugees were
diverse, and included “students, labor leaders, religious representatives, and others who
had been persecuted because of political involvement in their respective countries.”88
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Developing around the same time as the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement were two
nonprofit community organizations that focused specifically on the growing Salvadoran
community in the Westlake, Pico Union, and MacArthur Park neighborhood of Los
Angeles.89 This location reflected the transforming neighborhood of Pico Union –
although it had historically been a poor African American neighborhood, following the
Central American, and more narrowly Salvadoran, Diaspora, this MacArthur Park region
became the hub for the Salvadoran refugees arriving to the United States, and is still
today very recognizably a Salvadoran and Central American community.90
The first organization, El Rescate, was founded in 1981 by a group of Salvadoran
refugees who had previous activist experience primarily through schools and universities
in El Salvador. In the beginning, El Rescate served as a catchall organization for a variety
of the needs of Central American refugees and also worked to implement a “multifaceted approach to address past human rights abuses perpetrated by military and
paramilitary forces.”91 El Rescate did not attempt to frame the violence as solely onesided and coming only from the Salvadoran armed forces but also actively acknowledged
the violence coming from the FMLN. This distinction allowed for the reports done by El
Rescate, along with the data on human rights abuses in El Salvador during the Salvadoran
Civil War, to be much more credible than that coming from either the Salvadoran media
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or the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. Additionally, it would be this data on each reported
circumstance of human rights violations, compiled under El Rescate’s “Index to
Accountability” leading up to and during the 1992 end of the Salvadoran Civil War that
the United Nations would use to run a Truth Commission and shape the Salvadoran Peace
Accords. Therefore, in the beginning, El Rescate not only focused on providing aid to the
Salvadoran community in Los Angeles, but also on ending the political violence and
Salvadoran Civil War while also ensuring that there would be an appropriate reference
point, the Index, to be used in assigning accountability for the human rights violations
committed throughout the Salvadoran Civil War.92
El Rescate began as a very small nonprofit organization with only three paid staff
members – a lawyer and two paralegals – along with a substantial network of activist
volunteers. This network of volunteers was one of the main reasons for El Rescate’s
success and influence, because these individuals were largely “Salvadorans linked to an
array of organizations and social movements,” so, “the NGO was able to factor many of
the complexities into its work to provoke and facilitate change.”93 Over its 38-year
history, it has helped thousands of people while remaining relatively small, with a paid
staff of only 10 people. Because El Rescate was the first of its kind in the United States, it
attempted to address a wide range of needs of the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran
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community through the provision of services such as homeless shelters, a medical clinic
(Clínica Monseñor Oscar Romero or the Archbishop Oscar Romero Clinic), deportation
defense, and the legal representation of refugees seeking political asylum. El Rescate
developed a strategy to address the root causes of refugee flow, or the political violence
within El Salvador, as well as a specific Legal Department, developed in 1987, to petition
international organizations, such as the United Nations, on the dire situations plaguing the
Salvadoran refugees.94
The Central American Refugee Center, or CARECEN, was founded two years
after El Rescate in 1983 by “a Salvadoran refugee committee, United States church
leaders, attorneys, and community activists,” and its development was undoubtedly
influenced by the early successes of both El Rescate and the Los Angeles Sanctuary
Movement.95 However, CARECEN differs from both El Rescate and the Los Angeles
Sanctuary Movement in that it is a national organization with four regional offices, in
addition to the initial office in Los Angeles, in San Francisco, Houston, New York, and
Washington, D.C., which are, and were during the 1980s, major arrival city hubs for
Salvadoran and Central American refugees arriving in the United States. The initial office
in Los Angeles offered “legal and social services to those fleeing the war and, after the
war, it created new programs, including cultural programs and educational activities for
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youth.”96 However, like El Rescate and the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement,
CARECEN relied heavily on the already existent networks of religious and other activists
that were already established in El Salvador prior to the Salvadoran Diaspora.
Additionally, because religion, specifically Catholicism, is a large part of Salvadoran
identity, the incorporation of this value and the use of religious leaders in activist groups
was very strategic and contributed to the solidification of a transnational Salvadoran
identity and community in the Westlake Los Angeles neighborhood.97
The Sociopolitical Strategy of the Salvadoran “Refugee” Classification
Due to the aforementioned differences in the United Nations and United States
definitions of refugee, and because U.S. policy excluded Salvadorans from accessing this
status, one of the main focuses of the three activist groups, as well as many others,
focused specifically on advocating for Salvadorans to be identified as refugees in the
United States. Therefore, these activist community organizations adopted a strategy
founded in framing Salvadorans as refugees in the United States. Additionally, the initial
hope of Salvadoran refugees was that the Salvadoran Civil War would be quick.
However, this hope pretty much fully vanished in 1983 when the “FMLN in El Salvador
shifted to a strategy of guerra prolongada,” or prolonged war.98 This realization that the
conditions in El Salvador would not be getting better anytime soon also contributed to the
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increased activist for the legal, political, and social recognition of the Salvadoran
communities within the United States as communities of refugees and also led to the
foundation of more groups like El Rescate and CARECEN that focused specifically on
“the legal, political, and humanitarian needs of the burgeoning United States Salvadoran
population.”99 These activist groups, as well as the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees
themselves, made an active attempt to invoke a political strategy founded on
distinguishing themselves from “other immigrant groups on the ground that they were
entitled to refugee status and had more compelling reasons to be in the United States.”100
This would remain a key component of the political and legal strategy of the activist
organizations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s when the switch from the focus of
Salvadoran identity as refugees to an identity of a legitimate group of immigrants
deserving of legal status in the United States.101
Prior to the late 1980s and early 1990s switch from Salvadoran refugee identity to
Salvadoran immigrant identity, the political tactic of continuously framing Salvadoran
refugees as refugees, which they were under United Nations law but not United States
law, was a key component of the political, legal, and humanitarian approaches taken by
all three of the activist groups previously mentioned. These activists who employed this
strategy that “sought not only to save lives and prevent deportations, but also to affect the
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course of the Salvadoran Civil War.”102 By framing Salvadorans in the U.S. as refugees,
activists hoped to extend federal legislation that would grant Extended Voluntary
Departure (EVD) status, similar to an early form of Temporary Protected Status, to
Salvadorans in the U.S. and, therefore, recognize them as refugees. This would not only
aid the individual lives and communities of Salvadorans that had been established, and
were the main focus of the activist organizations, but it also, as the activist organizations
argued, could lead to an earlier end to the Salvadoran Civil War. The activist
organizations thought that the granting of EVD status to Salvadoran refugees in the U.S.
could lead to an earlier end in the Salvadoran Civil War because if the U.S. government
officially recognized Salvadorans in the U.S. as what they were, refugees, “the U.S.
government would be unable to continue sending military aid to the Salvadoran
government, which would in turn promote either a guerrilla victory or a negotiated
settlement.”103
However, this was a difficult strategy to pursue, especially under the Reagan
administration which was, by 1987, “supplying over $1 million a day in military and
other aid to the Salvadoran government,” and therefore continued to recognize
Salvadorans in the U.S. as economic migrants deserving of deportation rather than
refugees deserving of protection and aid.104 Activist organizations continued to fight back
through this necessary legal and political strategy, and they incorporated the publication
of refugee “testimonies” or narratives of persecution and flight because the activists
believed that, “just as they had been galvanized into action by hearing detained
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Salvadorans’ and Guatemalans’ accounts, other listeners’ consciousness about the events
in Central American policy could be changed by these narratives.”105 This strategy
continued until, as previously mentioned, the late 1980s and early 1990s and the
changing political climate within the United States necessitated the change in Salvadoran
identity from refugee to immigrant.106
During the early 1980s, Salvadoran activists invoked the refugee identity of the
Salvadoran communities in the United States and tied it to narrative refugee
“testimonies” that often included a reminder to the intended audiences of these
testimonies of the “bombings, tortures, massacres, and other abuses that pervaded El
Salvador during the Civil War” in order to assert that Salvadorans would have been
entitled to refugee status in the United States due to their experiences of persecution if the
United States’ immigration and refugee policy was not biased to exclude refugees from
“friendly” nations in the context of the Cold War. This strategy was effective in “linking
this suffering that is grounds for political asylum to the hardship that is a basis for
suspension of deportation.” Additionally, this framing strategy greatly contributed to the
activist community organizations’ effort to counter the official position of the U.S.
government, as shown through a declassified 1987 Department of State memo, that most
Salvadorans arriving in the 1980s “are not fleeing political persecution, but rather are
leaving for economic reasons.”107 By advocating for the recognition of those arriving
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during the Salvadoran Diaspora in the 1980s as refugees, rather than economic migrants,
the activist community organizations utilized a political strategy that would be most
effective in countering this official narrative of the U.S. government. However, as the
1990s began, and more Salvadorans chose to stay in their established communities rather
than go back to a nation that they had little to no real connection to anymore, framing the
Salvadoran communities as communities of refugees no longer made the most political
sense. This led Salvadoran activists to redefine these communities as individuals who had
set down roots and were entitled to a legal status in the United States while
simultaneously moving away from the term “refugee,” which had increasingly gained a
connotation of helplessness and dependency, two terms that no longer fit the wellestablished Salvadoran communities. During the 1990s, specifically following the 1992
Peace Accords, activist organizations furthered this argument for legal status for the
established Salvadoran communities by arguing that, by recognizing the legal permanent
residence status of Salvadorans, the United States would be supporting the peace process
in El Salvador. This argument was founded on the concept that “mass deportations would
destabilize economic and social reconstruction, potentially giving rise to renewed
conflict” and contributed to the U.S. government creating the Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) and first applied it to the Salvadoran communities established throughout the
Salvadoran Diaspora.108
Mimicry as the Highest Form of Flattery: The Washington, D.C. Parallel
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Although El Rescate and CARECEN were the two premier activist community
organizations involved in providing aid to the growing Salvadoran community in Los
Angeles, there were many other organizations that existed either before or soon after El
Rescate and CARECEN. However, it was after the creation of El Rescate and
CARECEN, and the examples that these activist community organizations set, that either
preexisting Latin American-focused organizations created a specific El Salvador-centered
program or entirely new activist organizations were founded. Additionally, although the
most significant number of Salvadorans arrived and settled in Los Angeles during the
early 1980s, Washington, DC also had a fairly large increase in Salvadoran population
within the community during the Salvadoran Diaspora. Therefore, Washington, D.C. and,
in the later years, the Northern Virginian suburbs of Washington, are an important
parallel to the Salvadoran refugee experiences in Los Angeles. The groups that existed
during this early portion of the Salvadoran Diaspora and the Salvadoran Civil War that
will be covered in this section are the Latin American Youth Center, D.C. (LAYC-DC),
the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the Committee in Solidarity with
the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Additionally, although two of these organizations
focus on Latin America broadly, it was during the 1980-1992 time period, specifically
following the start of the Salvadoran Diaspora and the creation of El Rescate and
CARECEN, that these organizations began to either focus specifically on El Salvador or
establish a program dedicated uniquely to the needs of Salvadorans in the United States.
The first Washington, D.C.-based activist community organization that dealt
specifically with the growing Salvadoran community was the Latin American Youth
Center in DC (LAYC-DC). LAYC-DC was founded in 1968 as a wide-ranging
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community organization dedicated to “address the absence of services for the emerging
Latino community” by “offering educational and vocational activities in after school and
in the summer at several locations in the community.”109 The real focus of the
organization narrowed around the mid-1980s to provide “social services and mental
health counseling program to assist traumatized immigrant youth arriving in DC after
fleeing the civil wars engulfing Central America.”110 It is especially important to note that
the focus on the provision of aid and a welcoming community to traumatized Central
American youth fleeing the political violence developed in the years immediately
following the development of El Rescate and CARECEN in Los Angeles, as well as at
the same period during which the violence of the Salvadoran Civil War and the resulting
Salvadoran Diaspora was at its height. Therefore, although the LAYC-DC has a wider
focus of all of Latin American youth in need of a community within the D.C. area, many
of its goals and specific programs developed in tandem with increased Salvadoran
immigration to the D.C. area, said programs mirrored many of those established within
the Los Angeles community, and many of the programs addressed the specific needs of
the growing D.C.-based Salvadoran community. In 1974, the LAYC-DC was officially
recognized as a nonprofit entity with 501(c)(3) status and moved into the Woodrow
Wilson Center where it stayed until the Wilson Center’s programs grew too big and
moved into the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. The Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars is “the nation’s key non-partisan policy forum
for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform
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actionable ideas for the policy community.”111 The close partnership between the LAYCDC and the Wilson Center in both of the organization’s early years was apparent and can
be seen through the fact that the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center was
established in 1977. Although El Rescate and CARECEN did not focus specifically on
the provision of resources dedicated to the building of a community of youth in their
early years, this did become a focus of both organizations, and other LA-based
organizations that will be discussed in Chapter 3, as a way to strengthen the Salvadoran
communities as a whole. However, the LAYC-DC’s focus on creating a community and
providing a safe space for Salvadoran refugees arriving in DC did closely resemble the
goals of El Rescate and CARECEN of fostering a way for Salvadorans to have access to
a group with individuals that had similar experiences, additional educational resources on
both language and how to apply for citizenship, and a mental health clinic to aid the
community.
Another DC-based organization that preexisted the start of the Salvadoran
Diaspora but adapted to specifically accommodate the increasing Salvadoran community
in the DC area was the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA’s early
focus was more similar to that of the legal aid programs of El Rescate than LAYC-DC,
especially due to its unique focus on the advocacy for human rights in the Americas.
WOLA was founded in 1974, so prior to the official start of the Salvadoran conflict and
Salvadoran Diaspora, by church leaders as a reaction to the U.S. intervention and support
for the military junta in Chile. Although created prior to the start of El Salvador’s Civil
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War, the important parts to recognize about this activist community organization is
twofold. First, WOLA was founded by church leaders, mirroring the importance of the
Los Angeles-based Sanctuary Movement and the role of church leaders in conjunction
with Salvadoran activists in establishing El Rescate and CARECEN. Additionally,
religion is and was a significant portion of Salvadoran identity, so by incorporating
church leaders into human rights-focused political advocacy would have contributed to
the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the Salvadoran community, as well as the
Latin American community in general. Secondly, WOLA continued to exist, and
expanded to focus on El Salvador, following the start of the Salvadoran Civil War and the
increased Salvadoran community in DC resulting from the Salvadoran Diaspora in order
to “connect policymakers in Washington to those with first-hand knowledge of the
thousands of deaths, disappearances, cases of torture, and unjust imprisonment occurring
under the dictatorships of that era.”112 Not only does this purpose very closely resemble
the use of testimonials under the Sanctuary Movement, but the strategy of increasing the
awareness of policymakers on the political violence in El Salvador was an ultimate goal
of El Rescate and CARECEN as part of an attempt to stop the funding going out of the
U.S. to El Salvador.
The third and final activist community organization that began during the early
years of the Salvadoran Civil War and the Salvadoran Diaspora was the Committee in
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). CISPES’s foundation is different
from all of the aforementioned activist community organizations in that it started as an
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umbrella organization of a widespread and autonomous group of activists. Additionally,
CISPES was founded “by conventions in Los Angeles and Washington, DC in October of
1980,” and would grow into a national grassroots solidarity organization focused on
supporting the Salvadoran people’s “struggle for social and economic justice.”113 The
impact of the organization’s national grassroots campaign was maximized starting in
1985 when “CISPES transformed from a loose network into a unified national
organization committed to a common program, which proved critical.”114 Therefore, the
focus of CISPES was also more international rather than focused on the domestic issues
within the communities it was located in like the other organizations previously
discussed. However, it is important to note that CISPES’s two initial bases were in Los
Angeles and DC, the two arrival cities in which all of the community-focused
organizations previously mentioned were located in. This further shows just how
important the connections between the activists and refugees were to the ultimate creation
of Salvadoran-led and focused organizations. On a similar note, the centering of
Salvadoran communities in LA and DC in the early 1980s foreshadowed the importance
of the physical neighborhoods in establishing a new transnational Salvadoran identity in
the United States while still maintaining a connection to the refugees’ memories and
connections to El Salvador due to their access to others who had gone through similar
experiences. Most of CISPES’s early activities were protest-driven and resulted from the
Reagan administration’s slogan of “El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam.” Although the
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strategies for the other activist community organizations were not quite as protest driven,
at least not in their early/foundational beginnings, most of them included the same
ultimate early goal of CISPES: to use highly visible mass protest campaigns in order to
draw public and policymaker attention to just how negative the ongoing U.S. financial
and political support for El Salvador’s violent military dictatorship was while at the same
time showing that the FMLN was not the villain nor were the Salvadoran refugees
dangerous economic migrants.
Although the sheer number of Salvadorans entering the Washington, DC area
during the early years of the Salvadoran Diaspora pales in comparison to its parallel in
Los Angeles, the growing Salvadoran community in DC was significant compared to the
rest of the United States. Even though both LAYC-DC and WOLA existed with a focus
on Central Americans in the DC community prior to the beginning of the Salvadoran
Civil War and Salvadoran Diaspora, both organizations were greatly impacted and
adapted by emphasizing a new focus on Salvadorans arriving in DC specifically in the
early 1980s. Additionally, although WOLA and CISPES both had a greater focus on
advocacy and protest to influence policymakers regarding foreign policy and immigration
policy impacting El Salvador, this focus makes logical sense due to the locations of the
organizations in the capital, which would inevitably give said organizations greater
access to and visibility from said policymakers. Finally, although the focus on the needs
of the Salvadoran refugee community based in Los Angeles was much greater than that
of similar organizations in DC, the activism of said DC organizations served as a
complimentary parallel to those in Los Angeles, especially in the years following the
1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords that will be discussed in Chapter Three.
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Chapter Three: An Increasingly Salvadoran Los Angeles and the Evolution of the
Activist Community Organizations

This chapter focuses on the later period of the Civil War in El Salvador as well as
the aftermath of the 1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords. It traces the evolution of the
established communities of the Salvadoran Diaspora as well as the creation of new
activist community organizations, and the evolution of existent ones. This chapter also
highlights the changes in U.S. law related to immigration, refugee, and relevant foreign
policies. Finally, this chapter will address both the positive and negative forms of
unintended consequences that resulted from a combination of the above factors, and how
said unintended consequences impacts the transnational Salvadoran community in the
U.S. and El Salvador, as well as the present-day consequences of these unintended
consequences and the role of the mass media.
U.S. Legislation and Immigration Policies
Around the mid-1980s, a number of political shifts happened within U.S. law that
would directly impact the growing Salvadoran immigrant communities. These policies
greatly impacted the legal status of Salvadoran immigrants, the roles played by the
already established activist community organizations, and the increasingly tense
relationship between the United States and Central America.
Up until the mid-1980s, the primary way Salvadorans could have legal status in
the U.S. was achieved by applying for political asylum. This, as well as refugee status, as
previously mentioned in Chapter Two, was quite difficult for Salvadorans to achieve. To
be granted political asylum, one had to have documented proof of a “well-founded fear of
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persecution,” for example. Due to the nature of the conflict, where the U.S. sided with the
Salvadoran government – the group that was perpetuating violence and repression – it
was politically complicated for Salvadorans to be granted asylum from an ally of the U.S.
government. Not surprisingly, many Salvadorans did not obtain legal status in the United
States during this pre-1986 era.
The first piece of federal legislation to be adopted during the Salvadoran Diaspora
was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. IRCA was the first major
revision of American immigration legislation and was an amendment to the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act. The main provisions of IRCA allowed for the
legalization of undocumented migrants who had been continuously present in the U.S.
since 1982, created official punishments for employers that knowingly hired
undocumented workers, and required increased monitoring and enforcement at U.S.
borders. This greatly impacted a large portion of the Salvadoran refugee community,
many of whom still did not have a legal status in the United States due to the
nonrecognition of Salvadoran migrants as refugees, largely by seemingly providing a
path to legal status that, in reality, would still be quite difficult to access.115
Most Salvadorans came into the United States after 1982, because the violence of
the Salvadoran Civil War increased dramatically following the strengthened activities of
the organization of the FMLN, and the subsequent response of the Salvadoran Armed
Forces, in 1983. Additionally, because Los Angeles was a key arrival city for Salvadoran
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migrants, IRCA “imposed particular challenges in Los Angeles given the large
undocumented population in the region, which included not only refugees but also many
other immigrants, chiefly Mexicans and Central Americans.”116 Additionally, prior to and
even after the passage of IRCA, the main legal concern of the Salvadoran community
was “to avoid deportation, not to legalize their stay,”117 therefore, few Salvadorans
applied for a legal status unless they had been apprehended by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Initially, many Salvadoran refugees were disinterested in
obtaining legal status in the U.S. because they believed that the Civil War would be short,
yet effective, and that they would be able to return to their homes and families relatively
soon. As the Civil War dragged on, and the violence and persecution devastated El
Salvador, many of the refugees realized that this hope was not the reality and, therefore,
began to seek legal status. Similarly, for Salvadorans who did seek legal status in the
United States under IRCA, the court cases were largely unsuccessful. For these reasons,
IRCA was not as effective as it was intended to be, especially in Los Angeles where
activist community organizations worked to find loopholes in the law and continued to
pursue other sociopolitical and legal strategies outside of IRCA in order to continue to
provide aid to the Salvadoran community.118
Outrage over the U.S. immigration and refugee policies that seemingly excluded
Salvadorans from accessing the legal asylum or refugee status characterized the period
leading up to and including the mid-1980s. This outrage had manifested into a legal suit
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against the U.S. Attorney General and the head of the INS in 1985. Although this lawsuit
was first filed in 1985, and the court granted the plaintiffs the right to litigate the “issue of
a pattern and practice of discrimination carried out by the INS by denying the asylum
claims and refusing extended voluntary departure to these refugees,”119 nothing really
came to fruition until 1990. In American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, which is
colloquially referred to as the ABC lawsuit, the main plaintiff, the American Baptist
Churches, alleged that the U.S. Attorney General and the head of the INS “violated
domestic and international laws when they denied asylum to Salvadorans and
Guatemalans fleeing political repression in the 1980s.”120 The suit argued that by not
allowing for equal access to asylum or refugee status for individuals from “friendly”
nations, like El Salvador and Guatemala, compared to “unfriendly” nations, like
Nicaragua, demonstrated how the U.S. asylum process was inherently biased against
refugees facing political violence, repression, and persecution coming from nations in
which the U.S. supports the governing regime in power. Additionally, although the court
recognized the plaintiff’s right to litigate these issues, it also maintained that international
refugee law, like that of the United Nations, does not supersede the domestic U.S. 1980
Refugee Act. Although the ABC lawsuit was not wholly successful in every aspect, it did
lead and contribute greatly to the passage of the 1990 Immigration Reform Act and gave
Salvadoran refugees who had been denied asylum after 1980 the opportunity to have their
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asylum applications re-adjudicated, or reviewed for a second time, through a legal
process to receive formal judgment on the disputed asylum status.121
A major factor of the Immigration Reform Act of 1990 was the provision that
created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program. Just as its name suggests, TPS
gives individuals to have a temporary legal status within the United States. Salvadorans
were the first recipients of TPS. TPS also provided the legal space for Salvadorans to
reapply for political asylum under rules that prevented the previous bias against granting
asylum to migrants from “friendly” nations. TPS meant that the U.S. government
implicitly acknowledged that Salvadorans had a right to be in the United States because
of the conditions in El Salvador “that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from
returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the
return of its nationals adequately.” Both of these conditions directly applied to the still
Civil War-stricken Salvadoran state until 1992 and, following the end of the Civil War,
the weakened Salvadoran state institutions unprepared to effectively repatriate the
substantial number of Salvadorans who had left during the Salvadoran Diaspora.122
Although Nicaragua had a revolution over similar issues as El Salvador, the
Nicaraguan revolutionary group, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was
able to successfully oust the repressive Somoza dictatorship from political power in 1979.
Therefore, from 1979 to 1990, the FSLN was in control of the Nicaraguan government.
Additionally, from 1981 to 1990, Nicaragua suffered through the Contra War, which was
an uprising against the revolutionary FSLN government by the Contras, which was a
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counter-revolutionary group that was backed by the U.S. in a manner similar to the U.S.
backing of the Salvadoran government during the Salvadoran Civil War. Like the
Salvadoran Civil War, this was a long drawn-out and bloody conflict. However, the
Contra War, unlike the Salvadoran Civil War, has been much more historically
contextualized as a Cold War “proxy war” between the United States through the Contras
and the Soviet Union and Cuba through the FSLN. This contributed to why, under U.S.
asylum and immigration policy, Nicaraguan refugees fleeing an “unfriendly” FSLN
revolutionary government were accepted while Salvadorans, fleeing a “friendly” U.S.backed government, were not. The point is that much of the immigration law directed to
Central Americans throughout the Cold War was piecemeal and contradictory. Therefore,
the U.S.’s antagonism towards the Nicaraguan government ultimately opened the door
for Salvadoran legal status.
The final piece of national U.S. legislation from the 1990s that directly impacted
the Salvadoran community came five years after the official end of the Salvadoran Civil
War. The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), passed
in 1997, was initially created to apply to Nicaraguans alone. NACARA addressed the
difficulty in the re-adjudication of asylum cases promised by the ABC suit that many
Central Americans were having under the Immigration Act of 1990 and the TPS
provision. NACARA creates the possibility of “amnesty for Nicaraguans who entered the
United States before December 1, 1995, and restores suspension [of deportation]
eligibility for ABC class members, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans who applied for
asylum before April 1, 1990.”123 Many of the activist groups continued to work on
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obtaining a legal status for the Salvadoran communities under NACARA by linking the
social situation within El Salvador to Nicaragua and made multiple arguments on the
potentially destabilizing effects on the Americas as a whole that would result from the
mass deportations that would inevitably come from not extending a form of legal status to
Salvadorans similar to that extended to Nicaraguans. Although IRCA, the ABC suit, TPS,
and NACARA all addressed portions of immigration and refugee policy issues that
complicated Salvadoran migration, all four still had gaps in legal protections that activist
community organizations would be crucial in during the post-Peace Accords period
through legal advocacy and general aid. However, these policies that characterized the
political climate relating to Central American immigration in the 1990s would also
redefine the struggle for refugee and immigrant rights and, consequently, redefine the
necessary role of the activist community organizations in the period following the end of
the Salvadoran Civil War.124
1992 Peace Accords
The Chapultepec Peace Accords were a seemingly huge success for the people of
El Salvador and the international community concerned with El Salvador’s history of
human rights violations and inequality. Following the FMLN’s 1989 “Second Final
Offensive,” the transition to peace and disarmament within El Salvador began. The
transition took place between 1990 and 1992. Peace negotiations were an international
affair that relied heavily on the leadership and structure of the United Nations because

Chinchilla, Hamilton, and Loucky, “The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los
Angeles,” 118; Coutin, “The Formation and Transformation of Central American Community
Organizations in Los Angeles,” 170; Coutin, “From Refugees to Immigrants,” 909-911, 918; Coutin,
Nations of Emigrants, 8; Susan Bibler Coutin, Sameer M. Ashar, Jennifer M. Chacón, and Stephen Lee,
“Deferred Action and the Discretionary State: Migration, Precarity, and Resistance,” Citizenship Studies
21, no. 8 (September 2017): 951-955.
124

82
tensions were very high between the warring factions. The Chapultepec Peace Accords,
which was the negotiated end to the Salvadoran Civil War, has been cited as a great
success by the international community. However, that ultimate ending point was very
difficult to achieve and was due to a variety of intersection factors both within El
Salvador domestically and within the international community as a whole. In 1989, the
hope of a real negotiated peace seemed far-fetched. The first reason for this negative
outlook was due to the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) political party winning
the Salvadoran presidency. ARENA was the political party founded by the U.S.-backed
Salvadoran oligarchy that was in charge of, and the progenitor of, the human rights
abuses of the military dictatorship and the group that the FMLN was fighting throughout
the Civil War. This alone seemingly threatened the chance of any negotiated peace
settlement in El Salvador’s near future. Additionally, the November 1989 “Second Final
Offensive,” an offensive that has been referred to colloquially as “the El Salvador Tet,”
was launched by the FMLN in the hopes of ending the Civil War through an FMLN
victory over the ARENA government. In response to this “Second Final Offensive,” the
Salvadoran military continued to commit a number of human rights violations including
the murder of six Jesuit priests which sparked the outrage of the international community.
Yet, despite this series of increasingly terrible events that seemingly would make the
potential of a negotiated peace settlement a far-off dream, the Chapultepec Peace
Accords were signed by all parties involved in the Salvadoran Civil War just three years
later.125

Ernest H. Evans, “The El Salvadoran Peace Process Five Years On: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism 21 (1998): 171-172; Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, “Making Meaning of Violence: Human
Rights and Historical Memory of the Conflict in El Salvador,” Journal of Human Rights 17, no. 3 (2018):
370-373; Almeida, Mobilizing Democracy, 66-67, 86; Coutin, “The Formation and Transformation of
125

83
In contrast to the FMLN’s “First Final Offensive,” mentioned in Chapter One, in
which the FMLN was clearly unprepared to wage a full-on Civil War against the
Salvadoran military dictatorship, the “Second Final Offensive” revealed just how evenly
matched the two sides of the Salvadoran Civil War had become. As one assessment of the
Salvadoran peace process put it, “the 1989 FMLN offensive starkly dramatized the fact
that the military situation was stalemated; specifically, while this offensive showed that
the FMLN had the ability to launch a major, sustained, countrywide offensive, it also
showed that the El Salvadoran military was strong enough to indefinitely prevent the
FMLN from being able to stage the sort of victorious “final offensive” that the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas had launched in July 1979.”126 This acceptance of a relative
stalemate for the foreseeable future of the conflict, as well as the economic, social, and
political toll and stress this ongoing conflict would place on both sides and the general
public of El Salvador, was reinforced by the ending of the Cold War in 1989. Not only
did this drastically change how the Salvadoran Civil War was conceptualized in the
international community, but it also led to a dramatic decrease in outside support and
assistance from the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and revolutionary movements
in the surrounding Latin American nations to both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War.
Additionally, with the ending of the Cold War and the decrease in interest in the small
Central American nation from the global superpowers, specifically the United States, “an
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opening was created for various other international actors to do what they had tried to do
(with little success) during the Cold War – to mediate a negotiated settlement of the
conflict.”127 The two largest, and most influential, international organizations that led this
new push for a negotiated peace settlement and transition to democracy were the United
Nations and Amnesty International, both of which had played a role during the Cold War
but were ultimately overshadowed by both the roles of both sides of Salvadoran actors
within the conflict and the United States. Although the United Nations and Amnesty
International played the most significant roles in the transition from massive violence,
repression, and human rights violations to a negotiated peace and democracy,
organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and various religious
groups that were, for the most part, founded in the Catholic Church.128
Throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, Amnesty International had been compiling
data on and releasing reports detailing the human rights situation within El Salvador.
These reports contributed greatly to the ability of the United Nations to both negotiate a
peace settlement and establish a Truth Commission intended to hold human rights
violations perpetrators on both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War accountable for their
role in the conflict. Additionally, during the early stages of negotiation, both the FMLN
and the ARENA-led Salvadoran government agreed to allow for the establishment of a
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) which would begin its
initial work in 1991 for one year and then have its presence in El Salvador extended until
1995. However, prior to the ONUSAL establishing a Truth Commission dedicated to
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combatting impunity within El Salvador and leading to the assignment of accountability
and responsibility for the human rights violations that were committed throughout the
Salvadoran Civil War, the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords needed to be negotiated and
agreed upon by the FMLN and the Salvadoran government.129
The Salvadoran process to peace included a series of four agreements that
culminated in the Chapultepec Peace Accords over the two-year period of negotiations
largely mediated by the United Nations. These agreements and negotiations covered a
wide range of topics, including, but not limited to, “economic and social problems (for
example, land reform), demobilization and integration of FMLN and government soldiers
back into civilian society, and confronting the country’s tragic past, including its systemic
violation of human rights.”130 This emphasis on the need for land reform in a more
equitable way was an issue that historically had plagued El Salvador and had been a large
motivation for both the aforementioned revolts that ended with the 1932 La Matanza as
well as a large motivating goal of the creation of the umbrella organization of the FMLN.
In fact, issues surrounding the desire for land reform had been a significant motivating
factor in many of the other Central American revolutions in which the United States
intervened in during the Cold War era. In El Salvador, and under the Peace Accords, this
desire for land reform culminated in the creation of the accord-mandated program called
the Programa de Transferencia de Tierras, or the Land Transfer Program (PTT). The
PTT mandated that “over the six years following the signing of the accords, 10% of the
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nation’s agricultural land was transferred to ex-combatants of both sides and to civilian
supporters of the FMLN.”131 Although this land reform was significant, it was not the
only portion of the Peace Accords that would contribute to the transition to peace and
democracy in El Salvador.132
Additionally, the Peace Accords established three separate yet interconnected
mechanisms in order to focus on and adequately address El Salvador’s history of a
pattern of human rights violations. These three strategies were founded in “mandating
structural reforms, creating a quasi-judicial Ad Hoc Commission to remove from military
service those implicated in human rights violations and corruption, and creating a Truth
Commission to compile an official public accounting of El Salvador’s history of human
rights abuses.”133 The United Nations was particularly highlighted for laying the
groundwork to democracy through “a scaling back of the Salvadoran armed forces and
their subordination to civilian authority, the demilitarization of public security through
creation of a new civilian police force, and broad reforms of the Salvadoran justice
system.”134 Unfortunately, many of the agreed upon negotiations were not fully achieved
following the end of the Peace Accords, contributing to the “new” wave of violence and
inequality in El Salvador that was founded in organized crime, a continuously corrupt
government, and a still highly militarized, biased, and violent police force. For example,
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although the Peace Accords and the ONUSAL Truth Commission promised judicial
reform and an increased accountability for the perpetrators for the human rights
violations of both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War, this was made more difficult by the
passing of a wide-encompassing blanket amnesty and impunity law only five days after
the final version of the negotiated peace agreement was ratified. While the Chapultepec
Peace Accords did end the massive and ongoing human rights violations and political
persecutions that characterized the Salvadoran Civil War, they failed to follow through
with the complete implementation and continuation of all of the various negotiated
agreements between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. This created a new kind
of unofficial, as in no longer state-sponsored, type of violence and political persecution
facing El Salvador from the 1990s until the present and contributed to the out-migration
of Salvadorans to the United States for years to come. The failure to achieve peace, so to
speak, resulted in an increasingly complex relationship between El Salvador and the
United States. This is also a great factor in the transformation of identities and roles of
the activist community organizations focused on Salvadorans in the United States.
A Shift in Strategy of the Activist Community Organizations
Meanwhile, as the Salvadoran Civil War was coming to an end and the
Chapultepec Peace Accords were being ratified, a different, yet just as significant, change
in the approaches of U.S.-based activist community organizations serving the growing
Salvadoran communities in the United States was occurring. This shift in strategy also
occurred alongside the shift in immigration, refugee, and foreign policy of the United
States. Even in the later years of the Salvadoran Civil War while activists were still
generally referring to Salvadorans as “refugees,” many of the individual Salvadorans
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began settling and establishing roots in their communities after recognizing that the Civil
War was not going to be short nor were the long-term impacts and damage caused by the
fighting going to be quickly or easily repairable. This led to an increase in Salvadoran
businesses and restaurants within the urban Los Angeles community, further showing
both the “vibrancy and permanence of the community.”135 It was during this moment that
preexisting activist community organizations, like El Rescate and CARECEN, began to
reassess their strategic claim that Salvadorans, and other Central Americans, were
refugees and moved towards referring to the members of their communities as
immigrants. This strategic shift was even implemented on an institutional level within
CARECEN through the changing of its name from the Central American Refugee Center
to the Central American Resource Center. As activist community organizations redefined
themselves and the Salvadoran community, the goals of the organizations were redefined
as well, going from striving for the legalization in the 1980s as a means to prevent
“untimely and perhaps life-threatening deportations,” to the 1990s goal of legitimization
of the transnational identity Salvadoran community by “securing the legal rights enjoyed
by citizens and legal permanent residents” for said Salvadoran communities who had
established roots in the United States.136
During the 1990s, the strategy of activist community organizations shifted in
order to argue for the legitimization of the legal status of the members of distinctly
Salvadoran communities within the United States on the basis of their “now lengthy
period of residence, the ties they have created, the work they have performed, the taxes
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they have paid, and the role that the United States played in the conflict that caused them
to emigrate.”137 This strategic shift was arguably necessary for multiple reasons, the first
of which was that the term “refugee” inherently implied that the need for U.S. residency
was based solely on the temporary conditions of El Salvador and, following the end of
the Civil War and the implementation of the Peace Accords, this strategy no longer had
as compelling grounds to stand on compared to the very obvious and visible issues of
violence and persecution of the Civil War. Therefore, under this track of argumentation,
the strategy of self-identifying the Salvadoran community as refugees was no longer
likely to succeed which led to an increased risk of deportation. The second major
rationale for the switch in strategy from classifying Salvadorans as refugees to classifying
them as immigrants was because of the “negative connotations” that were/are associated
with the term refugee. These connotations, especially during the 1990s, were associated
with individuals or groups who were powerless, helpless, or fleeing. Activists recognized
that not only did these connotations not adequately embody the Salvadoran experience,
but they also did not depict the Salvadoran community within Los Angeles as “a
successful community that had set down roots in the United States and intended to
stay.”138 These established roots were embodied by not only the establishment of activist
community organizations dedicated to the Salvadoran community, but also through the
creation of businesses on the El Salvador Community Corridor in Westlake and the
revitalization of the MacArthur Park space. Additionally, in support of this argument,
activist community organizations pointed to the fact that many Salvadoran Los Angeles
residents maintained good standing in the communities they helped to develop by acting
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“like a good citizen,” contrary to the mass media’s extensive coverage and fearmongering
related to “Central American” gangs like MS13.139
Activist community organizations that led this shift in strategy also were most
often heavily involved in not just the social sphere, but the legal and political spheres as
well. By continuously advocating for the legal residency status of the Salvadoran
immigrant population, and having both major and minor successes and setbacks through
the gradual increase in accessibility of legal residency status for Salvadorans who arrived
during the Salvadoran Diaspora as shown through the series of various pieces of
legislation aforementioned directly relating to the Salvadoran battle for changes in the
U.S. asylum and immigration laws, the activist community organizations established
during and after the Salvadoran Diaspora made a real difference in the Los Angeles
Central American community during the late 1980s and 1990s. Said activist community
organizations were also able to gain success in their goal of obtaining legal residency
status for Salvadorans through the argument that the individuals who made up the
Salvadoran communities were justified in their claims to legal residency membership by
reminding both policymakers and the general public of the dreadful experiences in El
Salvador during the Civil War that ultimately caused the Salvadoran Diaspora in the first
place. Activists, thus, persuasively reminded people “of the bombings, tortures,
massacres, and other abuses that pervaded El Salvador during the Civil War” in order to
further support their overarching argument that Salvadorans would have been entitled to
asylum during the 1980s and legal residency status in the 1990s had their claims been
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adjudicated fairly.140 This strategy went beyond simply pointing out the bias in the U.S.
asylum courts by “linking this suffering that is grounds for political asylum to the
hardship that is a basis for suspension of deportation” in order to not-so-subtly imply that
“the past hardship that caused immigration is as relevant to legalization as the future
hardship that deportation would pose.”141 Moreover, in relation to this argument against
mass deportations, activist community organizations pointed to the still present danger
awaiting many Salvadoran citizens if they were to return to El Salvador, specifically, the
new post-Peace Accords crisis of the Salvadoran state of “contemporary
“disappearances” due to organized crime, with multiple thousands of victims believed to
have gone missing in recent years.”142
Along with the two aforementioned arguments, activist community organizations
made two broader final arguments for their shift in strategy from framing Salvadorans as
refugees to immigrant communities worthy of legal residency status. The first of these
wide-ranging arguments was that the United States, due especially because of its
involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War and in Cold War-era Central America in
general, had a moral responsibility to accept Central Americans as residents because
without U.S. intervention it was unlikely that the Salvadoran Diaspora would have
happened, or would have been as extensive, or as long lasting as it was. The persuasive
qualities of this very emotionally charged and hypothetical argument when made in
combination with the other arguments, was a very strong point made by the activist
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community organizations. The second broad argument was that by supporting the activist
community organization’s goal of legal residency status, the United States would be
playing a crucial role in the young Salvadoran peace process. To support this claim,
activists argued that without the application of some form of sweeping legal residency
status to the established Salvadoran community members, there was a high risk of mass
deportations of Salvadorans out of the United States and to El Salvador. Any nation that
would have to face a sudden influx of people needing repatriation in a short amount of
time would struggle, however, the new state institutions that arose out of the recent Peace
Accords in conjunction with both a weakened governmental authority and a general
public traumatized from the Civil War’s twelve-year period of violence would make
recovering from the Civil War and fully implementing the goals of the peace process
especially difficult. Therefore, as activist community organizations argued, “mass
deportations would destabilize economic and social reconstruction, potentially giving rise
to renewed conflict.”143 This argument, although ultimately unsuccessful in acquiring
sweeping legal residency status for Salvadorans in the U.S. or fully preventing its goal of
mass deportations, was a very strategic move on the part of the activist community
organizations. For one thing, this argument framed the role of the United States as vitally
important in the “new” history of post-Peace Accords El Salvador which subliminally
played off of the ever-present view, especially in the post-Cold War-era, that the United
States was, and was needed to continue to be, the dominant hegemonic power in the
American sphere of influence. Secondly, the activist community organizations implied
that without U.S. support El Salvador risked failing economically, socially, and
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politically in achieving the goals of the Peace Accords. Additionally, without U.S.
support, El Salvador could be at risk of starting, or restarting, a Central American conflict
similar to that of the Cold War-era Civil War. Although both broad arguments were fairly
persuasive on their own, when argued in conjunction with both the contention that the
Salvadoran immigrant community in Westlake had set down roots and were productively
and positively contributing to the Los Angeles community as a whole as well as an
argument founded in reminding the U.S. policymakers and general public of the causal
role of the U.S. intervention in driving the Salvadoran Diaspora, the activist community
organizations’ shift in strategy from framing Salvadoran members of the communities as
refugees to immigrants worthy of legal residency status was relatively persuasive and
comprehensive. Additionally, the shift in strategy was, at least in the short run, fairly
successful in driving the success of the ABC lawsuit, the resulting TPS program being
first applied to Salvadorans, and to the, albeit not permanent or generalized, legal
residency of members of the Salvadoran immigrant community.
The Evolution of El Rescate and CARECEN
El Rescate and CARECEN both played a crucial role in the shifting of strategy in
order to better cater to the evolving needs of the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran
community in the post-Peace Accords era. After experiencing a short “identity crisis,”
these organizations began to reflect the changing needs of the Salvadoran community
within the changing sociopolitical climates of both the United States and El Salvador by
beginning to orient their “political activities towards pushing for legal permanent
residence for Salvadorans” as well as beginning to provide “the kinds of services that
long-term settlers might utilize, such as educational programs, legal services, and the
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promotion of home ownership, savings, and investment.”144 Additionally, looking at
these organizations in the even more long-term scope of their goals and purpose
presently, El Rescate and CARECEN have built on those goals and have “turned their
energies to providing the sorts of social services that more established migrants need,
including information about higher education, purchasing homes, professional licensing,
and legal aid.”145 This transition in the identities of El Rescate and CARECEN was not
seamless nor did it happen overnight, but, throughout the transition, both organizations
were able to continue to serve the Salvadoran community within Los Angeles and while
at the same time advocate for the creation of a legal residency status for the Salvadoran
immigrant population. This was possible both because of the established histories of the
two organizations as well as because of the increasing number of activist community
organizations that were established in Los Angeles throughout the late-1980s and 1990s
period of transition.
During the transition from conflict to peace following the 1992 Peace Accords, El
Rescate played a crucial role in both El Salvador and Los Angeles. Since the
establishment of El Rescate’s Human Rights Department in 1985, El Rescate had
“monitored, maintained a database of violations, and…published reports on the country’s
human rights situation.” However, in the years leading up to the ultimate ratification of
the Peace Accords, El Rescate’s goals “shifted from documenting and denouncing human
rights abuses to defining a strategy for facilitating positive social change in El Salvador
based on human rights law.”146 In order to achieve this, El Rescate focused largely on the
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obstructions caused by the generalized impunity law passed five days following the Peace
Accords that limited the scope of the process of determining accountability for the
violence throughout the Salvadoran Civil War. Under the Peace Accords, which were
monitored by a United Nations Special Mission, El Rescate gained a fairly large win
because of the Peace Accords’ provisions dedicated to “significant structural changes in
the Salvadoran security forces, the creation of an Ad Hoc Commission to “purify” the
security forces of human rights abusers, and a Truth Commission designed to create an
official human rights history.”147 Although not all of these mandates would actually come
to full fruition, they did set a standard against any potential future similar military
dictatorships or cases of state sponsored political violence and human rights violations in
El Salvador.148
Additionally, under El Rescate’s leadership, the issues surrounding impunity,
amnesty, and accountability were addressed through a fact-based reporting tool entitled
the Index to Accountability. The Index covered the entire 12-year period of the Civil
War, and its findings were based largely on the data from Tutela Legal, a Salvadoranbased human rights organization, and a two-year study completed by El Rescate.
According to Salvador Sanabria, the founder and current head of El Rescate, the “Index
became like an official source of information for the U.S. government and the Canadian
government to be used against human rights violations perpetrators applying for
adjustment of status in the U.S. or Canada, or for those that the governments of the U.S.
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and Canada established that they committed fraud by admitting to answer questions as to
their military, police, or persecutor status.”149 Although the database is not currently
available online, its publication is being worked on under the Center for Human Rights at
the University of Washington in Seattle under the leadership of Angelina Snodgrass
Godoy with the goal of publishing it online and making it available to researchers at
some point later this year. It was the information compiled under the Index that,
according to Sanabria, “provided critical information to the UN’s Peace Accords Special
Mission in El Salvador to advise them in the work of the Truth Commission, and the
Truth Commission set up by the UN worked by publishing reports on the atrocities
committed during the war and established who were responsible for those.”150 This focus
on documenting and denouncing human rights abuses within El Rescate through the
Index to Accountability in order to contribute to the process of accountability that was
absent throughout the Salvadoran Civil War and during the actual writing of the Peace
Accords remained a major portion of El Rescate’s focus until the mid-1990s. The focus
then shifted again to “defining a strategy for facilitating positive social change in El
Salvador based on human rights law.”151 This shift recognized the need for a focus on
accountability in El Salvador’s past history, but also on the ongoing issues preventing full
recovery in the collective Salvadoran social memory that stemmed largely from the
“institutionalized impunity for past human rights abuses in El Salvador.”152
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As for El Rescate’s changes in goals and programs reflecting the 1990s shift in
the specific needs of the Los Angeles Salvadoran community from its foundation in 1981,
many new programs have become a part of El Rescate. For example, although El Rescate
had previously focused on the legal and sociopolitical structures and legislation that
directly impacted the growing community of Salvadorans in the Los Angeles area, after
the end of the Civil War, El Rescate focused on the legal need of Salvadorans in the
adjudication of individual immigration court cases. Sanabria emphasized the importance
of this focus, both in the 1990s as well as in the more modern era, especially under the
Trump administration presently, but also emphasized the establishment of El Rescate’s
citizenship program, saying that “we consider that [citizenship is] the most effective
shield against the xenophobic and anti-immigrant policies of this current administration
governing our country is to have U.S. citizenship.”153 Another program developed around
the same time of the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords was that of a transnational
program under which El Rescate extended the reach of their humanitarian aid and legal
programs into their already established role of defending the rights of immigrants living
in the Los Angeles community. Additionally, this transnational program sought to
“educate immigrants migrating in irregular forms from Central America to the United
States in how to protect their rights on their way to the United States” because of the
need, in the case of Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans, “to cross two or three
nations and they need to face, they will face, different realities in their trek though the
territories of those nations.”154 Overall, from the 1980s to the 1990s to the present, El
Rescate maintained and increased their role in providing services unique to the evolving
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needs of the growing Salvadoran communities in Los Angeles and greatly contributed to
the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran community’s recognition as legitimate immigrants
deserving of legal residency status, and all the benefits that come along with this status,
in the United States.155
CARECEN, like El Rescate, also maintained and grew their role in Los Angeles
after the 1992 Peace Accords. According to its website, over the thirty years CARECEN
has existed, it has gone from “a small grassroots group to the largest Central American
organization in the country, providing low-cost immigration legal services, policy
advocacy in immigration, education reform and workers’ rights, and organizing knowhow for parents, youth and workers.”156 CARECEN’s website also specifically
acknowledges the shift in strategy of many of the activist community organizations that
have a focus on the Salvadoran Los Angeles community from refugee to immigrant by
stating that “its clients also changed, from refugees fleeing war to vibrant immigrant
families and workers sinking roots in the United States.”157 CARECEN, like El Rescate,
recognized the importance of educational services to the established Salvadoran
community in Los Angeles, and provides “education, enrichment, and leadership
development programs for children, youth, and adults through its Parent Center, Youth
Center, and citizenship classes.”158 In addition to CARECEN’s Los Angeles
headquarters, a sister office was established in Washington, D.C. Although this office
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was established at the same time as CARECEN in Los Angeles, it really began to grow in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the increase of Salvadorans migrating to
the Washington, D.C. area. The shift in the focus of programs in both CARECEN-LA
and CARECEN-DC reflected the evolving needs of the growing Central American
communities surrounding the two arrival city hubs and, like El Rescate, no longer just
focused on ensuring that the immigrant communities were legalized but that the
individuals within the community were accepted and able to further establish roots within
the United States. CARECEN did this through a series of new 1990s community support
services like job application help, document translation, job searches, and obtaining
insurance and housing. Additionally, the legal advocacy of CARECEN during the 1990s,
especially in the D.C. area, was especially vital in helping reform the aforementioned
series of refugee and immigration laws that “destabilized the residency statuses of many
Central American immigrants.” Although CARECEN clearly continued to play a very
significant role in the lives of the Salvadoran communities during the 1990s, one of the
greatest, yet less direct, impacts that it had was on the creation of two new activist
community organizations: The Salvadoran American Leadership and Education Fund
(SALEF) and the Asociación de Salvadoreños in Los Angeles (ASOSAL).
New Activist Community Organizations
In the 1990s, two new activist community organizations that had direct ties with
CARECEN were founded in the Los Angeles community. The first of these organizations
to be established was the Asociación de Salvadoreños in Los Angeles (ASOSAL).
ASOSAL was established in 1991 as a direct offshoot of CARECEN with the intended
purpose to “fight for an immigration legal status and to defend the rights of
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immigrants.”159 A secondary goal of ASOSAL was to help create a cultural space to
allow for a distinctly Salvadoran “cultural identification” that could be disseminated to
future generations of Salvadoran-Americans that ran the risk of being disconnected from
El Salvador. The initial purpose for its establishment was to focus solely on obtaining an
extension of the TPS program for Salvadorans and, in conjunction with El Rescate and
CARECEN, ASOSAL lobbies the U.S. and Salvadoran governments to “promote the
establishment of legal permanent residency for Salvadorans in the United States.”160
ASOSAL’s greatest achievement is the grassroots support that it has been able to drum
up in the support of its legal advocacy and cultural programs. However, by working
alongside of El Rescate and CARECEN, ASOSAL has also been able to focus on
providing educational, cultural, and social services that blend the Salvadoran identity
with the American identity through providing English and citizenship classes that would
increase the integration of the Salvadoran community members into the greater
multicultural Los Angeles area while at the same time not abandoning but, rather,
encouraging the continuation of distinctly Salvadoran culture and identity within the
community. This thematic focus on education and the blending of the Salvadoran identity
with the American identity into a transnational Salvadoran-American identity came out of
the post-Peace Accords shift in strategy of organizational focus on gaining acceptance for
the established Salvadoran communities. Additionally, these types of programs would
continue to grow in importance throughout the 1990s until they were just as important
within the communities served as the initial legal and political focus of activist
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community organizations and programs, like El Rescate and CARECEN, that came out of
the 1980s and the Salvadoran Diaspora during the Civil War.161
The second organization that emerged in the 1990s, the Salvadoran American
Leadership and Education Fund (SALEF), also embodied this new increased emphasis on
the transnational Salvadoran-American identity and the promotion of the importance of
education for Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles. SALEF was founded by Carlos
Vaquerano, who had previously worked as a community activist for CARECEN, in 1996
with the stated mission to “promote the civic participation and representation of the
Salvadoran and other Latino communities in the U.S., promote the economic
development and democracy in El Salvador, as well as to advocate for its economic,
educational, and political advancement and growth.”162 Additionally, according to Karla
Cativo, the current Outreach and Organizing Manager of SALEF, SALEF was “created
with the intention of opening up a space for the youth from Central America that was
coming into the U.S. to have access to higher education, to going to college, to going to
universities if that was what they wanted to do.”163 Therefore, by establishing SALEF,
which was the first educational fund established in the Los Angeles region dedicated to
creating those opportunities, SALEF was able to address a need that Vaquerano saw as
missing, but necessary, whilst working for CARECEN in order to address the evolving
needs of the Salvadoran-American community in Los Angeles during the 1990s. Over
time, SALEF would grow to address many of the same areas as El Rescate, CARECEN,
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and ASOSAL, like naturalization services and legal services, but would remain largely
focused on the importance of youth education through their scholarship, youth
employment, and community college course programs. By partnering with a local
community college, SALEF is able to “offer college courses revolving around the topic
of Central American studies to local youth.”164 This college course program was
established to address the problem that the “youth is very disconnected with the history of
Central America, and what we [SALEF] are doing with these courses is opening that line
of communication for them so that they can explore a little bit more where they come
from because, at this point, a lot of local youth is born here and no longer coming straight
from the country.”165 The purpose of the focus of these classes was, according to Cativo,
was both to preserve the Salvadoran culture and identity within the disconnected youth
generations born in the United States as well as to explain, through historical context
dating back to the 19th and 20th centuries, “a little more background on why the countries
are the way that they are and why there is so much immigration coming from those
areas.”166 This shows that, like ASOSAL and the newer programs of El Rescate and
CARECEN, the youth-specific focus in the 1990s was becoming increasingly important,
as was the focus on programs that encouraged the Salvadoran community to maintain
their unique transnational identity while still integrating their community as a whole into
the multicultural identity of Los Angeles.
Collaboration between the Los Angeles-based activist community organizations
has been an important key in their ability to obtain a positive outcome from a variety of
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projects. Cativo emphasized the role of collaboration with other activist community
organizations focused on Salvadorans and Central Americans in the more recent
successes of SALEF. She acknowledged that, during the 1980s when a majority of the
original activist community organizations were founded by people arriving through the
Salvadoran Diaspora, many of the founding activists came together to determine what
types of organizations and programs were needed to address all of the various needs of
the growing Salvadoran Los Angeles population. This collaborative inception of the
Salvadoran and Central American-focused activist community organizations was vital in
contributing to their initial success and the legacy and standard set by said success and,
so, in order to continue this collaborative legacy, SALEF put an important emphasis on
working together with other organizations for the ultimate well-being of the communities
being served. This collaborative legacy, according to Cativo, allowed the comparatively
new and small organization to make a lot of headway on a variety of projects. When
asked how SALEF was able to provide so many various services successfully with a staff
of only seven, Cativo answered “I know how it gets done – it’s because we have
awesome, kickass community partners and we all stick together, and we are able to get
things done together.”167 SALEF typically worked with El Rescate and CARECEN but
has also collaborated on projects benefitting the community with a number of Los
Angeles Catholic organizations. Additionally, in the near future, SALEF has the very real
possibility of further expanding its transnational focus by establishing an office in San
Salvador to continue SALEF’s focus on Salvadoran youth by through extending their
youth services, scholarship fund, and history course programs into El Salvador. Cativo
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stated that the purpose of expanding into El Salvador would also help address many of
the same issues facing Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles, especially “in terms of
understanding intergenerational trauma and connecting with historical memory, which
are things that have almost been erased form the academic and consciousness of the
Salvadoran youth.”168 Finally, an example that encompasses SALEF’s dedication to the
Salvadoran transnational identity and historical memory in Los Angeles was the 2012
installation of a statue commemorating Monsignor Oscar Romero in the center of the
increasingly Salvadoran within MacArthur Park. The effort to get this statue installed in
the public space of Los Angeles was extensive, and it took a fairly long time, but the
effort was led by SALEF because of the importance of MacArthur Park as a key
landmark for the Central American community of Los Angeles.169
The third, and final, new activist community organization that emerged following
the Peace Accords was Homies Unidos. Although initially founded in 1996 in San
Salvador, Homies Unidos soon thereafter gained a Los Angeles-based office in 1997.
The stated mission of Homies Unidos was to “end violence and promote peace in our
Central American communities through gang prevention; the promotion of human rights
in immigrant communities and the empowerment of youth and families in El Salvador
and Los Angeles to achieve their full potential in a just, safe, and healthy society.”170 The
foundation of Homies Unidos was largely in response to the proliferation of U.S.-based
gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13, that began in Los Angeles and the subsequent
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problems U.S. policy and deportation practices caused for the Salvadoran government
and people following the transnationalization and spread of these gangs into Central
America. However, Homies Unidos does not try to pull the gang members out of the
gangs. Instead, Homies Unidos attempts to accomplish their mission by eliminating
violence and providing gang members with training in nonviolence and conflict
resolution as well as skills such as computer graphics and design. The Homies Unidos
Los Angeles chapter was founded by Alex Sanchez as a way to provide an alternative to
“gangs, drugs, and other negative activity”171 for the youth in the Pico Union
neighborhood of Los Angeles, where gang membership was especially prevalent and
common. Additionally, Homies Unidos worked to promote other educational
opportunities for the Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles.
Although Homies Unidos has a different overarching goal than many of the other
activist community organizations in Los Angeles, they still serve generally the same
communities and have had to adjust their approaches to programs and problems in similar
manners to other activist community organizations. Additionally, Homies Unidos has
also collaborated with many of the other aforementioned activist community
organizations on larger projects related to topics such as legislative policy advocacy. For
example, in 1997, “several gang members linked with the network traveled to El
Salvador with a delegation arranged by CARECEN.” Upon this delegation’s return to
Los Angeles, many noted that the “conditions in El Salvador were even worse than on the
streets of Los Angeles, and the network has incorporated goals such as reducing the
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deportation of gang members to El Salvador and other countries.”172 This sentiment was
echoed by Alex Sanchez, as shown through his actions and focus on new programs, along
with the other members of the Los Angeles-based chapter of Homies Unidos, such as
negotiating with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow Homies
Unidos to “distribute literature to gang members facing deportation with information on
how to contact Homies when back in El Salvador,” as well as his cooperation with U.S.
attorneys on “efforts to block gang deportations on the grounds that gang members (who
have been targeted by death squads in El Salvador and other countries) face the danger of
being killed on their return.”173 Elena Zilberg points out a depressing parallel in her
article “Refugee Gang Youth: Zero Tolerance and the Security state in Contemporary
U.S.-Salvadoran Relations,” stating that the “U.S. and El Salvador appear to be locked in
a repeating history. Salvadorans were forced out of El Salvador as civil war refugees in
the 1980s, only to be forced out of the United States in the 1990s as criminal deportees.
Today, Salvadoran youth and young adults are fleeing El Salvador once again, this time
as a result of the combined pressures of both gang and state violence.”174 It was under
this sociopolitical context that MS-13 was created in Los Angeles and subsequently was
what created the space and need for an organization founded in nonviolence like Homies
Unidos.
Negative Unintended Consequences
The formation of activist community organizations, a transnational Salvadoran
identity, and growing Salvadoran-American community in Los Angeles were all
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relatively “positive” unintended consequences resulting from the Salvadoran Diaspora.
Even though these consequences are being referred to as “positive” in this context, by no
means were any of the series of events sparked by the extremely violent Salvadoran Civil
War and the subsequent fleeing from persecution and violence of Salvadorans to the
United States as a part of the Salvadoran Diaspora positive. Rather, the ability of
Salvadorans arriving in the United States, and specifically Los Angeles, to make the best
out of a terrible situation through the formation of activist community organizations
focused specifically on the Salvadorans who were arriving in Los Angeles and by
establishing roots, livelihoods, and communities following fleeing persecution were, in
this sense, a positive outcome compared to the much more negative point of view on the
terrible series of events that led many Salvadorans to their new Los Angeles
communities. Additionally, these “positive” unintended consequences of U.S.
intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War and the subsequent ten year period of massive
levels of violence, repression and human rights violations could also be considered
positive in comparison to two very negative unintended consequences of the continued
relationship between the United States and El Salvador in the 1990s: the creation of the
gang MS-13 and the exportation of strict U.S. criminal policing legislation into El
Salvador.175
Following the end of the Cold War and the Salvadoran civil war, the pattern of
state-sponsored political violence ended, but the underlying social, political, and
economic inequalities and tensions remained. Both negative unintended consequences
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can be viewed as a result of the switch in Salvadoran society following the end of the
Civil War and the ratification of the final version of the Chapultepec Peace Accords from
having to constantly endure the official state-sponsored political violence committed
directly from the Salvadoran government and military to gang violence which is a more
unofficial type of violence and persecution. This led to the transition from statesponsored political violence to the “new” dominant form of violence in the postwar
period: gang violence. The rise of gang violence in El Salvador similarly most negatively
impacted the marginalized urban youth demographic of El Salvador. However, unlike the
political violence of the Civil War era, the violence was committed by gangs, which are
non-state actors.
Despite the official end of the Civil War and the resulting reduction of statesponsored political violence, the nation of El Salvador still experienced high levels of
structural violence. It was in this context that the parallels between the violence in El
Salvador in the 1980s and the 2000s-2010s were most apparent. This comparison is most
effective by the continuation of the evaluation of elements of the Salvadoran civil war
previously discussed with the “new” manifestations of violence in El Salvador, the
changing roles and impacts of structural inequalities, the detrimental impact on
Salvadoran youth, and the transformation of the role of the United States in driving the
emergence of “new” gang violence in El Salvador. This “new” violence, although not
perpetrated by state-sponsored actors like during the Civil War, still has traceable roots in
the institutionalized structural causes of “rising social and economic inequality, poorly
functioning systems of law and order, and the illicit criminal networks functioning in the
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region.”176 This contemporary manifestation of violence was often attributed to the rise of
youth street gangs, or maras, during the postwar period. The young members of these
maras, like the revolutionaries that made up the FMLN, had a common feeling of social
exclusion and marginalization that was rooted in the frustrations with social and
economic hardship caused by the disruptive Salvadoran Civil War.177
The inability of the Salvadoran state to address the historical problem of social
inclusion is a vital contributing factor to this transformation from political violence to
gang violence. Social exclusion, which is defined as “the process through which
individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the
society in which they live,” is a breeding ground for the increasing Salvadoran youth
participation in gang violence.178 For Salvadoran youths experiencing social exclusion
and marginalization, “belonging and otherwise unobtainable recognition” can be found in
gang membership.179
The most well-known, but also most commonly misunderstood, Salvadoran gang
is MS-13. MS-13 was founded in Los Angeles during the 1980s and exported to El
Salvador following the end of the Salvadoran civil war. With the exportation of MS-13
into El Salvador, and its subsequent incorporation of the smaller, territorial domestic
youth gangs, the former street gangs have become political actors in El Salvador. The
politicization of MS-13 is shown through the social and political objectives of the gang
that transcended the previous motivations of economic prosperity. In looking at the new
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forms of power gained through the politicization of the gangs, it can be argued that the
presence of the gangs in El Salvador, and the threat of violence against any opposition to
the gangs, have allowed these third-generation gangs to take de facto control of the
Salvadoran state. This de facto control of the Salvadoran state is further strengthened by
the inability or unwillingness of legitimate Salvadoran state institutions to effectively
combat the increasingly politicized, transnational gang organizations. Additionally,
although MS-13 has become a transnational organization, this spread was largely
unintentional and was a result, for the most part, of “the secondary migration of Central
American families within the United States…and later as a result of the mass
deportations of gang members back to their home countries in Central America.”180
According to the eight-year immersive anthropological study of T.W. Ward, many of the
Salvadoran youths arriving during the second Salvadoran Diaspora of the 1990s in Los
Angeles chose to join a street gang in Los Angeles “partly as a product of their childhood
socialization to violence and the traumas of war, partly as a result of his feelings of
abandonment, resentment, and alienation, and partly as a response to this new form of
oppression.”181 Therefore, because of the unsafe feelings caused by the Salvadoran Civil
War’s unintended consequences, Salvadoran youth that desired a sense of belonging in
Los Angeles were disproportionately more likely to join a street gang of peers with
similar experiences, which is what MS-13 began as, in order to gain this sense of
belonging and, later, protection. These somewhat nonviolent origins of MS-13 would
quickly shift to a more violent and protection-oriented organization in order to stand up to
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the other violent street gangs in Los Angeles, and this violence would be what ultimately
led to a mass deportation and transnationalization of MS-13.182
Once back in El Salvador, the recently deported gang members recruited
Salvadoran youth from the already existing small-scale youth street gangs. Although
Homies Unidos did help abate some of the violence coming into El Salvador from the
U.S.-based gang members, the reach of the organization was ultimately not enough, and
the transnational gang organization grew in power and violence. This increase in
violence, as well as the need of the Salvadoran government to repatriate the returning
Salvadoran citizens, led to the second large negative unintended consequence of an
increasing preventatively harsh anti-gang and anti-crime legislation and policing strategy
within El Salvador. This anti-gang legislation in El Salvador manifested into the policy
El Plan Mano Dura and, like U.S. anti-gang legislation, it works, under the guise of
prevention, “to build a criminal record against youth through petty infractions and
channels young people into the criminal justice system before serious crimes are
committed.”183 El Plan Mano Dura, like the first negative unintended consequence,
inordinately impacted Salvadoran youth while limiting the ability of Homies Unidos to
actively work on the promotion of nonviolence in gangs in El Salvador.
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While the flow of immigrants from El Salvador to the U.S. continues as a long
continuum of failed Cold War and post-Cold War policies, contemporary immigrants
face more obstacles to achieving legal status due to archaic language of what it means to
be a “refugee” or “asylee.” The U.S. definition of refugee and asylee focuses on their
being persecuted by state-sponsored actors. However, in most gang-related asylum
claims, the persecution is from nonstate actors. In order for asylum in a gang-related
claim to be granted, it “is often necessary to establish that the state is unwilling or unable
to provide protection to these individuals.”184 The recent politicization of the gangs in El
Salvador combined with the failure of the Salvadoran state in combatting the violence
used by the gangs in El Salvador for youth recruitment and to gain social, political, and
economic control is the main justification for the surge of asylum-seekers from El
Salvador during the 1990s and 2000s. This led to, like during the Salvadoran Diaspora in
the 1980s, the exclusion of Salvadoran migrants from evenly accessing asylum status that
would allow them to more easily and safely enter the United States.
Additionally, these negative unintended consequences founded in the ongoing,
and increasingly complex and tense, U.S.-Salvadoran relationship inordinately impacted
youth, both within El Salvador and in the United States. As previously mentioned, many
of the new activist community organizations within Los Angeles attempted to somewhat
combat these youth impacts through education and community building, however, this
did not change much, especially for the youth involved in the gangs in the U.S., involved
in the gangs in El Salvador, or attempting to flee membership in or persecution from the
gangs in El Salvador by obtaining asylum in the United States.
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History, Memory, and the Solidification of a Transnational Salvadoran Identity
The official site of memory and remembrances of martyred Salvadoran
Archbishop Oscar Romero have been especially important to the Salvadoran community
in MacArthur Park as well as to the greater Los Angeles community. Romero, an
exponent of liberation theology who advocated for the poor in El Salvador, was
assassinated on March 24, 1980 while delivering morning mass. However, even though
Romero’s assassination was unsolved under the official investigations, it was largely
accepted and known by the Salvadoran general public that the assassination was
committed by one of the right-wing, pseudo-military “death squads” under the orders of
death squad leader Roberto D’Aubuisson because of the so-called “radical” messages
Romero preached in his masses and radio addresses.185
The official investigation of who, or which side of the Civil War, was responsible
for the assassination of Romero in the United States, in the eyes of the international
community, and under the Salvadoran state was an investigation that went unsolved for a
number of years following his assassination and remained a topic of interest throughout,
and following the ending, of the Salvadoran Civil War. This “unsolved” nature of the
assassination of Oscar Romero, as well as his ongoing importance as a figure of
martyrdom throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, is best illustrated through a series of
documents compiled under a 1987 “Secretary’s Panel” under Secretary of State William
L. Ball. Minnesota Senator Republican David Durenberger, who was apparently
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advocating on behalf of a constituent, wrote the following: “I urge you to begin a
thorough investigation into the brutal assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar
Romero. I do not believe that U.S. officials have a serious interest in finding those
responsible for this atrocity!”186 This not only showed the still unresolved nature of
Romero’s assassination, even in the eyes of the American public and government, seven
years following his assassination, but also revealed how significant of a figure and martyr
Romero was that recognition of his assassination by “death squads” was still a focus of
individual citizens and those concerned with human rights violations. The rest of the
documents within the compiled file span in dates of origins from 1987 to 1992 and
contain a fairly wide-ranging and deep amount of information detailing the various
official investigations into who was to be held accountable for Romero’s assassination,
ultimately ending with a post-Truth Commission document in which these questions were
finally officially resolved. It was here that the U.S. Secretary’s Panel recognized that:
Monsignor Romero had become a well-known critic of violence and
injustice, and as such, he was seen in right-wing civilian and military
circles as a dangerous enemy. His homilies provoked profound irritation in
these circles because they included accounts of incidents in which human
rights were violated…Therefore, individuals of high rank in the
government as well as the Armed Forces viewed the actions of the
archbishop as aiding subversion.187

These religious messages that were perceived as dangerous are exemplified
through Romero’s January 14, 1979 speech in which he stated “God is the judge of all
social systems. Neither the gospel nor the church can be monopolized by any political or
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social movement.”188 In this quote, Romero was still seemingly attempting to keep
church and state separate, however, by not providing approval for the repressive ARENA
government, Romero was inherently challenging the power of the political party in
charge and reasserting the power of both himself and the church as a leader in the eyes of
the Salvadoran people. This religious leadership assuring the Salvadoran people that the
Church will not be coopted by the repressive regime was important, even though Romero
himself in the near future would move from implicitly political to more directly political
in support of the rising revolutionary FMLN prior to his death and official martyrdom in
the memory of the Salvadoran collective consciousness. The official politicization of
Romero was especially apparent only about a year after his January 14, 1979 speech in
his February 17, 1980 homily entitled “Poverty of the Beatitudes, Our Strength.” In this
homily, Romero passionately stated that:
promises continue to be made but action is lacking. What has become
more evident this week is that neither the Junta nor the Christian
Democrats are governing the country. They are only allowing that
impression to be given nationally and internationally…and the bloody
eviction of the occupants from the Christian Democrats’ headquarters
show clearly that it is not they who govern, but rather the oppressive
sector of the armed forces… They assassinated them: they assassinated
various people in brutal manner…If the Junta and the Christian Democrats
do not want to be seen as accomplices of so much abuse of power and
accomplices of so many criminal acts, then they ought to single out and
punish those responsible for these actions.189
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Although the messages Romero was preaching throughout his public addresses to the
Salvadoran people had contained “revolutionary” or incendiary undercurrents of which
the death squads and the Salvadoran government would have seen as dangerous long
prior to this speech, it was at this point that Romero became not only explicitly political,
but a significant leader in the eyes of the repressed Salvadoran public and the FMLN.
The right-wing, ARENA-led government and D’Aubuisson feared Romero’s
messages would lend itself to the formation of more FMLN revolutionaries due to the
power of liberation theology to appeal to the poor. Liberation theology is most closely
associated with Latin American versions of Catholicism and is a synthesis of traditional
Catholic theology and Marxist concepts founded in advocating for a belief in the
salvation for the poor and oppressed members of society through their liberation from
social, economic, and political oppression. A prime example of Romero’s dedication to
this ideology was his September 23, 1979 public address in which he stated that “I will
not tire of declaring that if we really want an effective end to violence, we must remove
the violence that lies at the root of all violence: structural violence, social injustice,
exclusion of citizens from the management of the country, repression.”190
Romero’s work had deep historical roots in El Salvador, dating back to the desire
for agrarian and land reforms that sparked the 1932 Matanza. In the late 1970s preceding
Romero’s assassination, the dissatisfaction of the Salvadoran general public with the
inequalities of Salvadoran economic, social, and political structures was growing. It was
this dissatisfaction with the ongoing inequalities and oppressions of the poor that created
the space for the FMLN to first launch a revolution against the Salvadoran government.
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At the same time, it was the messages of Oscar Romero that were able to voice the
discontent of the people while at the same time preaching a message of ultimate hope
through the salvation from this oppression and inequality. This was a dangerous message
in the eyes of the Salvadoran government, especially in the context of the other Cold
War-era Central American revolutions that were ignited over similar issues.
Immediately following Romero’s assassination, he became, in the eyes of the
Salvadoran people, even if they had not previously been politicized or apart of one of the
revolutionary organizations combined under the FMLN umbrella, a martyr representing
the extreme violence and repression of the Salvadoran Civil War. The heroic status of the
martyred Romero was maintained in the social memories of Salvadorans and, more
widely, Central Americans from the time of the Civil War to the present. Additionally,
Romero’s messages founded in liberation theology, specifically his focus on the poor and
oppressed, continued to be highly applicable throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, the
Salvadoran Diaspora, the period immediately following the Chapultepec Peace Accords,
and through the 1990s and 2000s and into the present. Romero, although already widely
recognized as a martyr, received sainthood status on October 14, 2018 by Pope Francis
who, due to his Argentinian roots, was highly influenced by Oscar Romero. In Romero’s
canonization, Pope Francis emphasized Romero’s “dedication to the poor and
marginalized” and wore “the blood-stained rope belt Romero wore when he was gunned
down.”191 Not only does the official recognition of Romero’s influence in El Salvador,
and Latin America as a whole, but the physical wearing of Romero’s “blood-stained rope
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belt” further linked the sociopolitical significance and martyrdom of Romero in the
collective social memory of the transnational Salvadoran community.
The memory and importance of Romero to the transnational Salvadoran, and
Latin American, community as a whole also has gained more physical manifestations in
recent years within Los Angeles. For example, under the leadership of SALEF and in
conjunction with other community organizations and Los Angeles city officials, finally
got approval for the installation of a statue honoring Oscar Romero in MacArthur Park on
November 24, 2013. This was significant for the Salvadoran, and Latin American,
community within the Pico Union neighborhood of Los Angeles because MacArthur Park
is located right inside of this neighborhood and had, since the beginning of the
Salvadoran Diaspora, served as a gathering place for Latin American people in the
neighborhood in which soccer games were played, people participated in the informal
economy by selling food and goods, and people held protests against the Civil War and
the exclusionary immigration and deportation policies of the United States.192
In an interview following the installation of the statue within MacArthur Park,
Carlos Vaquerano, the founder and director of SALEF, stated that “Msgr. Romero is a
legend for Salvadorans, and having the statue in Los Angeles, the second largest
concentrations of Salvadorans, what more can we ask?”193 Vaquerano emphasized the
importance of Romero in the memory of the Salvadoran transnational community by
stating “he represents the struggle of many of us. He represents the beliefs and all those
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ideas of social justice, and I think having him in L.A. just sends a powerful message for
the future of our community.”194 The physical statue itself further emphasized the
transnational connections between El Salvador and the “faraway” community within Los
Angeles since the bronze likeness was “created in El Salvador by artist Joaquin Serrano
and flown to Los Angeles.”195 This journey of the physical statue from El Salvador to the
Pico Union neighborhood of Los Angeles in which a majority of the Salvadoran migrants
arrived and settled was representative of the Salvadoran Diaspora through the fact that
the statue, or source of memory, was created in El Salvador and then sent away to Los
Angeles to be given a new transnational meaning. Additionally, although the statue was
now a part of the Los Angeles community, like the creation of a uniquely SalvadoranAmerican identity for the migrants arriving and settling in Los Angeles, the statue will
always maintain a Salvadoran history and identity because of its origins in El Salvador.
The impact of the statue itself within MacArthur Park is twofold. First, the
placement of a statue of a martyr of the Salvadoran Civil War, in which the U.S. and
Oscar Romero were supporting opposing sides, explicitly recognized the significance of
the Salvadoran community to the Pico Union neighborhood. Secondly, it further
legitimizes all of the arguments previously made by the activist community organizations
in support of acknowledging the legal residency status of Salvadorans in the United
States and the importance of Salvadorans specifically to the growth of MacArthur Park,
and vice-versa. Finally, as acknowledged by then Los Angeles Councilman Ed Reyes that
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represented the neighborhood surrounding MacArthur Park, the statue of Oscar Romero
“will not only serve the Central American community, but it will offer Angelenos an
insight into the rich history and culture of our diverse city.”196 This sentiment is
representative of the importance of not just promoting the memory of Romero to the
Central American community’s social memory, but also in furthering the knowledge and
education of the rest of the Los Angeles community on the history and importance of the
ever-growing transnational Salvadoran community in Los Angeles.197
Overall, although all three of the activist community organizations that emerged
in Los Angeles during the 1990s had fairly distinct and different focuses from one
another, all three, in one way or another, focused on youth and education as a way to
address the evolving needs of the Salvadoran-American community. The emergence of
these organizations, as well as the continuation of El Rescate and CARECEN, allowed
for a wider range of needs of the Salvadoran and Central American communities within
Los Angeles to be addressed. Additionally, because all of these organizations focused on
and were headquartered in and around the Pico Union/MacArthur Park neighborhood in
which a majority of the community had arrived and settled in, it allowed for a greater
legacy of collaboration between organizations in advocating on the behalf of the
community in larger projects. Another positive outcome of the creation of the
transnational Salvadoran community within MacArthur Park was the establishment of
Salvadoran sites of culture and business that would contribute to the further development
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and vibrancy of the community. As previously mentioned, the public space of MacArthur
Park would ultimately recognize this established community by establishing a statue
memorializing the Salvadoran martyr Oscar Romero, but this was not the only public
manifestation of Salvadoran culture in the Pico Union neighborhood. Another park within
the community was renamed “Oscar Romero Park” and, after years of petitioning, the
City of Los Angeles officially renamed part of the community “Little El Salvador.” These
are just two of the official manifestations of Salvadoran-American transnational identity
in and positive influence on the City of Los Angeles as a whole. Salvadoran-Americans
have also been able to find “new sites to anchor, cultivate, and restore their much ravaged
memory and cultural knowledge” while at the same time promoting the growth of
Salvadoran-founded and run businesses on a section of Vermont Avenue known as the
“El Salvador Community Corridor.”198 The vitality of the Salvadoran-American
community in Los Angeles really began to accelerate in the 1990s following the
Salvadoran Peace Accords, despite the ongoing legal and political limitations to obtaining
official legal residency status. This growth of the Salvadoran-American community
throughout the 1990s allowed for the creation of a transnational Salvadoran identity and
culture and was due, in a large part, to the evolution of the preexisting activist community
organizations along with the needs of the community as well as the foundation of
additional activist community organizations to address, in more depth, the growing
focuses on youth, education, and the preservation of the collective social and historical
memory of the Salvadoran Civil War and Salvadoran Diaspora that first began the
creation of a Salvadoran community in Los Angeles.
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Conclusion

How does an understanding of the evolving U.S. relationship with El Salvador
and the resulting unintended consequences relate to the sociopolitical climate of today?
How are the contemporary debates over immigration and foreign policy related to these
historical moments? News coverage about the “northern triangle” countries of
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras that dominate news cycles in the era of the Trump
presidency – a president whose campaign promise was to build a wall between the U.S.
and Mexico—are rooted in the cycle of unintended consequences sparked by the U.S.
intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War. Despite the history and identity of the U.S. as a
“nation of immigrants,” the U.S., over the last 40 years, has moved toward an
increasingly exclusionary national policy against Central American immigration. Much
of this historic exclusion has come with a dehumanization and villainization of Central
Americans by both the national government and the mass media and, although this is by
no means a “new” product or sociopolitical reality, this misrepresentative caricature of
Central Americans has drastically increased since the election of Donald Trump as the
nation’s 44th President. His use of this strategy based in fearmongering and vague,
factually inaccurate claims in such a short space would be impossible due to both the
number of public statements or tweets Trump makes per day on average and the amount
of mass media coverage on these claims, however, this plethora of information, or,
perhaps more accurately, misinformation does make it easier to show how all of the
arguments made over the past three chapters matter to developing a more complete
understanding of the greater story on which Trump’s narrative is loosely based on.
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Neither the villainization of Central American immigrants nor having hardline
immigration policies is unique to the Trump administration. In fact, the Trump
administration might be seen as following in the footsteps of Barack Obama’s
administration on this issue – although both men are likely to hotly contest any such
characterization. President Barack Obama was referred to as “Deporter in Chief” by his
critics on immigration policy due to his administration’s ability to “forcefully expel more
than 3 million people from U.S. territory.” However, the Trump administration has not
only taken these anti-immigrant and deportation policies to an entirely new level than the
previous administration but has also managed to “strike down” the minor protections the
Obama administration conceded, like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) –
a renewable suspension of deportation for undocumented immigrants who arrived in the
U.S. at the age of two or younger – and TPS protection for Salvadorans, that had been a
major point of success for the advocacy of Central American-focused activist community
organizations.199
El Salvador specifically has been the disproportionate focus of Trump’s antiimmigrant stance and have faced mass deportations as well as “dehumanizing depictions
of scowling, tattooed MS-13 gang members to stigmatize immigrants and justify
escalating enforcement.” As previously argued, this depiction is emblematic of the
ongoing problem with the mass media and U.S. government’s focus on the small portion
of the unintended consequences that were negative compared with the overwhelmingly
larger and more significant “positive” unintended consequences. This disproportionate
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focus, the almost constant anti-immigrant and anti-Central America-founded xenophobic
and nativist rhetoric of Trump, his supporters, and the conservative media, and the lack of
adequate education in American schools on the role the United States played in the
violence of the Salvadoran Civil War has contributed to the misinformation surrounding
many of the contemporary debates surrounding topics related to immigration from
Central America and foreign policy. Therefore, by providing a more complete historical
background to these debates and emphasizing the “positive” unintended consequences, as
opposed to just the negative unintended consequences, this thesis makes a valuable
contribution to the overall understanding of a variety of topics, including the U.S.
interference in El Salvador, the Salvadoran Diaspora, and the role of activist community
organizations in establishing a transnational Salvadoran-American community in Los
Angeles.
Additionally, through this emphasis on the positive, this thesis confirms, and adds
to, Doug Saunders’s argument made in Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in
History is Reshaping Our World that the presence of migrants in “arrival cities” or urban
centers, like Los Angeles, is beneficial to the urban center as a whole and representative
of humanity at its best. The Los Angeles-based Salvadoran migrant community is a prime
example of the rural-to-urban migration on which Saunders’s arguments are based.
Furthermore, the positive impact made by Salvadoran-focused and founded activist
community organizations on Los Angeles as a whole echoed his optimistic view of global
urbanization in which migrant communities in arrival cities play a vital role. Therefore,
the focus on activist community organizations and positive unintended consequences of
the Salvadoran Diaspora is an important contribution to the small, yet growing,
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historiography on a more positive view of arrival cities and the necessary inclusion of
immigrants into the legal, social, and political structures of a city.200
Despite the end of the Cold War, as well as a number of ultimately unsuccessful
attempts at reform, the violence facing the Salvadoran youth remained founded in the
inequalities that existed prior to the Salvadoran Civil War. Since long before the
Salvadoran Civil War, the marginalized individuals of El Salvador have been fighting
against economic, social, and political inequality and repression. This fight began largely
under Salvadoran youth and revolutionary groups because the political system, and the
past attempts at governmental reform, had failed them. Decades after the end of the
Salvadoran Civil War, it is still the transnational community of Salvadoran youths that
are most detrimentally impacted by the failure of the Salvadoran state to protect them
from inequality, repression, and violence. The main changes from the period of the
Salvadoran Civil War to the postwar period of the 2000s-2010s was not represented, as
the revolutionaries intended, by reforms within El Salvador targeting the structural causes
of inequality and marginalization. Instead, the major change from the Salvador Civil War
to the postwar period was represented by the switch from state-sanctioned political
violence and persecution to gang violence that the state has proven to be ineffective at
combatting.
Therefore, the question of Salvadoran asylum, immigration, and ongoing and
deeply interconnected relationship between El Salvador in the context of today’s political
climate is complicated. This complex issue regarding both U.S. immigration policy and
U.S. foreign policy has historical roots that are best explored through the analysis of the
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Cold War-era United States intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, the sociopolitical
impacts this had upon El Salvador, and the transition from the Cold War instability and
political violence to the modern versions of violence that El Salvador faces today.
Additionally, by looking more specifically into the narrower impact these inequalities and
violence have on the Salvadoran youth, as well as on the growth of activist community
organizations, both the unintended and direct consequences of the Salvadoran Civil War
and the post-Peace Accords period are extra apparent. The debate between policymakers
surrounding how to best approach a potential solution to ending violence in El Salvador
has historically been a major focus and will continue to be a modern and future focus of
debate.
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